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ABSTRACT
Reflective functioning in patients with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia: an
examination of the effects of comorbid personality disorders
by
Tempe A. Watts

Advisers: Diana Diamond, Ph.D. and Barbara Milrod, M.D.
This study examined reflective functioning (RF) in patients who experience a
combination of panic and personality disorders (PD). Despite broadly accepted beliefs that
comorbid personality and Axis I disorders indicate poor prognosis, limited research has
examined how these two axes interact within a panic disorder population. The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders typifies personality disorders as fitting different clusters
categorization: cluster A referring to “odd” personality disorders, including schizoid, schizotypal
and paranoid PDs; cluster B referring to “dramatic” personality disorders, including borderline,
narcissistic, histrionic and antisocial PDs; and cluster C referring to “anxious” personality
disorders, including avoidant, dependent and obsessive compulsive PD. Reflective functioning
is a measure for the concept of mentalization, or an individuals’ ability to understand mental
states in themselves and others link their mental states to behavior and symptoms, while bearing
in mind the inferential nature of this process.
This study proposed that in a panic disorder sample: the presence of any personality
disorder will yield predictably low RF scores; that the presence of cluster B PDs will predict low
RF scores; and that the interaction of cluster B with cluster A or cluster C PDs will predict low
RF scores. This project determined that within this sample, the presence of personality disorders
is not related to RF score. Furthermore, no relationship between cluster B PDs and RF was
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found and no statistically significant interaction was determined. However, a statistical trend
toward significance for a three way interaction between clusters A, B and C with regard to RF
scores was evident, although the nature of this relationship was not able to be specified by this
dataset. The results suggest that in a sample with the primary diagnosis of panic disorder, RF
does not specifically correlate with differences in personality disorders. This project may
demonstrate limitations in the use of RF to distinguish personality disorders for patients with
panic disorder. Further study into the relationship between PDs and panic disorder is warranted,
particularly with regard to what aspects of panic or personality symptomatology become
amplified or less observable and are primarily impairing for the patient.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The treatment of patients with panic disorder, with or without agoraphobia, has a rich
body of research supporting efficacy of several types of psychotherapies. Outcome researchers
have only just begun to examine the factors that account for the variability in responsiveness to
treatment, such as patient characteristics and therapist implementation (Boswell et al., 2013). In
particular, patients who experience a combination of Axis I and personality disorders drop out of
psychotherapy at high rates and have comparatively lower response rates to treatment than
patients without personality disorders (McGlashan, 1986; Stone, 1993; Fournier et al., 2008) and
may suffer serious physical health conditions (El-Gabalawy et al., 2010). Despite the broadly
accepted notion that the presence of personality disorders in addition to Axis I symptoms
indicates poor prognosis, there has been limited systematic clinical trials research examining
how these axes, using criteria defined by the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual, interact (Skodol et
al. 2014; Telch et al, 2011, Siever & Davis, 1991). Further research is needed to understand how
admixtures of syndromes may affect various aspects of functioning and the outcome of
therapeutic interventions. This project will study patients with panic disorder with and without
personality disorders to investigate whether or not this relationship interferes with response.
Specifically, the construct of mentalization (Fonagy, Gergeley, Jurist & Target, 2002), which
will be further described below, will be taken into account as a cognitive-affective capacity that
may differ across diagnoses.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4th edition Text Edition, (DSM-IV-TR)1
organized psychiatric diagnosis across five axes, to account for a range of factors that were
1

For the purposes of consistency, the DSM-IV-TR will be referred to in the past tense, to acknowledge
the publication of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). However, diagnostic criteria discussed in this study will
exclusively refer to DSM-IV-TR standards, as the measures involved were based on that edition.
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thought to have an impact on mental health. Axis I referred to clinical syndromes, including
panic disorder and other anxiety and mood disorders (disorders of “state”), while Axis II referred
to developmental disorders, and personality disorders (PDs) (disorders of trait). The division and
standardization of psychiatric classifications based on potentially episodic phenomenology (Axis
I) and personality disorders (Axis II) has been operationalized since the construction of The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3rd edition (DSM-III, 1980), and used until the recent
publication of the DSM-5.
Clinical trials have improved our ability to understand and develop effective treatments
for discrete disorders. Panic Control Therapy (PCT, Barlow, Raffa, & Cohen, 2002), a cognitive
behavioral therapy, was specifically designed and studied for panic disorder, and found to be
efficacious. A multicenter controlled trial compared PCT, imipramine and their combination,
with pill placebo using the measure the Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS; Shear et al., 1997;
Shear et al., 2001) as the primary outcome measure to record response. Intent to treat (ITT)
analysis found that PCT alone yielded response rates at the end of three months of weekly 90
minute treatment sessions averaging at 48.7%, 39.5% after six months of monthly maintenance
treatment, and 32.4% six months after treatment termination (after 9 months of therapy; Barlow,
Gorman, Shear & Woods, 2000). ITT analysis of combined treatment of imipramine and CBT
yielded response rates at 60.3% at end of weekly treatment, 57.1% after six months of monthly
maintenance treatment, and 25.0% six months after treatment termination. Meta-analyses of
CBT studies have found that on average, 40% of patients entered into randomized controlled
trials of PCT are non-responders (Levitt, et al., 2001; Mitte, 2005), with response rates ranging
29-48%.
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The reasons for non-response to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in panic disorder have
been inadequately characterized, although frequently discussed. Studies of CBT have reported
mixed effects of Axis II co-morbidity on treatment response. Hoffart (1994) found worse CBT
outcomes for panic disorder inpatients with co-morbid dramatic and avoidant traits (N = 50 with
panic disorder and agoraphobia). However, Dreessen et al. (1994) reported treatment effects
were not diminished by the presence of co-morbid personality disorders in 2 open trials of
standard, time limited CBT (N = 31, N= 57 for panic disorder inpatients with comorbid
personality disorders). Bienvenu and Brandes (2005) argued against what they describe as the
“gross overgeneralization” that extremes in any personality traits with comorbid anxiety
disorders adversely affect response to treatment. However, in a descriptive paper, Ozkan and
Altindag (2005) found that panic disorder patients with comorbid personality disorders were
more severely ill across mood, anxiety and psychosocial domains than panic disorder patients
without personality disorders.
Panic Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, a manualized, time-limited
psychodynamic psychotherapy for panic disorder, has been studied far less extensively, but a
pilot study showed efficacy (PFPP, Milrod, Busch & Cooper, 1997; Milrod et al., 2007) and was
replicated by Beutel and colleagues (2013). In the 2007 study, Axis II/Cluster C personality
disorders (“avoidant” PDs, as described below) moderated treatment response to PFPP (N = 24
with PDs, N = 19 patients with panic disorder and Cluster C co-morbid personality disorders)
such that subjects with panic disorder and a comorbid Cluster C disorder improved to a greater
extent than those without Cluster C comorbidity, an unusual finding. Small sample size did not
allow for clear distinctions to be made between cluster C and other PDs. In both CBT and PFPP,
personality disorders may have some influence on treatment outcome, although the nature of this
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impact has been under researched. The Practice Guidelines for Panic Disorder for the American
Psychiatric Association (APA, 2009) recommend that research continue to explore the
effectiveness of psychodynamic psychotherapies in the treatment of panic disorder with other cooccurring disorders such as co-morbid personality disorders.
Personality disorders, as defined by DSM-IV-TR, are rigid or ingrained maladaptive
patterns of thinking, feeling or behaving.2 PDs have been vague and poorly described, with
similar or overlapping criteria. High incidence of co-morbidity between personality disorders
are consistently found (Craske et al., 2009) but it is unclear if the prevalence of co-morbid
diagnoses is due to verifiable and distinguishable co-occurring disorders. Vague and similar
classifications may account for some portion of high rates of co-morbidity. Further examination
of patients with co-morbid disorders may lend insight into underlying pathology and help
sharpen definitions and refine distinctions between personality disorders. Using the models of
Axis II disorders accepted in the DSM-IV-TR, this paper will further clarify variance between
people who may fall into these different diagnostic categories.
Patients with anxiety and comorbid personality disorders complain of more acute
symptoms, such as severity of anxiety, than anxiety patients without personality disorders (Van
Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999). The reasons for this have not been firmly established but rigid
personality factors may limit how individuals respond to anxiety, which may in turn exacerbate
anxiety (Tonna et al. 2011; Uguz et al. 2009). In fact, the case for a dimensional system for

2

This study used the ADIS-IV and SCID-II to assess Axis I and Axis II diagnoses and therefore adheres
to the DSM-IV definitions. However, definitions in the DSM-5 for both panic disorder and personality
disorders are essentially as they were in the DSM-IV, amid and despite intense controversy in the field
regarding definitions of personality disorders (McGlashan et al., 2005).
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personality disorders, debated prior to the publication of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,
5th edition (DSM-5) was argued, in part, because of the close interplay between Axis I disorders
and Axis II disorders. The Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study (CLPS)
study found both that personality disorders are not always stable and chronic, and that mood
disorders are more chronic and less episodic than had typically been assumed (Skodol et al.,
2011; Skodol, et al. 2010). Furthermore, in the CLPS study, patients with major depressive
disorder (MDD) who were also diagnosed with schizotypal, borderline, or avoidant personality
disorders as their primary PD diagnosis had significantly longer time to remission from MDD
than did patients with MDD without a co-occurring PD (Skodol et al., 2005). Even controlling
for other negative prognostic features, such as age of onset of MDD, pattern of MDD recurrence,
co-occurring dysthymia and other Axis I disorder comorbidity, PDs remained robust predictors
of slowed remission of symptoms of MDD. Understanding factors associated with comorbid
symptoms of panic and personality disorders may lead to more precise description of mental
disorders, and stimulate greater specificity in targeted treatments.
In this study, mentalization, as measured on The Reflective Function Scale (RF; Fonagy
et al., 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998; Rudden et al., 2006), will be examined to
offer further insight into the relationship between Axis I disorders, as described on the Anxiety
Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV), and personality
pathology, as measured on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality
Disorders (SCID-II; First et al, 1997). Distinctions made on the relationship between panic
disorder and personality disorders may begin to indicate refinements in treatment
recommendations.
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Mentalization is broadly defined as the capacity to perceive and interpret behavior in
terms of intentional mental states (i.e. needs, desires, feelings, beliefs, goals, purposes, and
reasons) (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy & Target, 2006; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002).
Fonagy and Target (2006) describe this as a “mostly preconscious imaginative mental activity,”
in that the process requires imagining the inner states of others and, especially reflective
mentalization, that is, the awareness that suppositions about others’ minds, and one’s own mind,
are not irrefutable truth. Mentalization requires attentional control, which can be challenging
during emotionally charged states, in order to selectively activate a sense of one’s own or others’
minds regarding particular intentions.
The Reflective Function Scale (RF; Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele,
1998; Rudden et al., 2006) was developed to operationally measure degree of mentalization in
the context of attachment relationships. Individuals differ significantly in the degree to which
they are able to understand thoughts and feelings, both their own, and those of other people.
Higher or lower RF scores indicate exceptional and diminished mentalization, respectively. In
cases of diminished mentalization (i.e. low RF), one’s own and others’ behavior can seem
unpredictable and other people’s minds may seem opaque and may therefore be interpreted with
significant distortion. With the (apparent) absence of mentalization (i.e. negative RF), the task
itself of reflecting on another person’s mind or reflecting on one’s own thoughts or feelings can
be experienced as an attack and may be actively rejected. The interaction of intense affective
states and the capacity for mentalization is speculated to have an influential relationship on affect
regulation (Solbakken et al., 2011).
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The theory of mentalization emerged out of an incorporation of “theory of mind”
research, attachment theory, and psychoanalytic concepts (Fonagy et al., 2002). The
development of mentalization is speculated to be essential to an elaboration of a sense of self and
to self-regulation, specifically supporting affect regulation. Different personality disorders are
associated with varying capacities and strategies for managing affect. RF has been most
frequently studied in patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder for the purpose of
comparing differences in the capacity for mentalization and understanding the role of pretreatment mentalization in mediating treatment outcome. RF has consistently been found to be
low (3 or below) in patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, who struggle with
affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2006). The capacity to mentalize has both
state and trait characteristics (Fonagy, Bateman & Luyten, 2012). Mentalization is not a fixed
and stable capacity, but rather can fluctuate during shifting self-states, particularly under deep
distress, or in reaction to an interpersonal context (Fonagy, Bateman & Luyten, 2012; Sperry,
2013; Chefetz, 2013).
Examination of the influence of mentalization across the range of non-BPD personality
disorders is a new but expanding field of inquiry. Reflective function has begun to be
investigated for patients with specific Axis I disorders, such as major depression, panic disorder
and post-traumatic stress disorder (Fischer-Kern et al., 2008; Rudden et al., 2006; Markowitz et
al., 2013). Further knowledge about the capacity for mentalization in a wider range of disorders
may help to refine understanding of the underlying dynamics of symptoms and characteristics
that define these disorders.
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This project will examine the capacity for mentalization in a sample of patients with
primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without co-morbid Axis II diagnoses, with a range
of severity, as diagnosed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime
Version (ADIS-IV) and Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders
(SCID-II; First et al, 1997). The data are drawn from one site of a two-site, randomized
controlled trial (Barbara Milrod and Jacques Barber, Principle Investigators NIMH R01
MH70918-01A2; R01-MH070664) comparing three psychotherapy interventions for primary
DSM-IV-TR panic disorder: Panic-Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy (Milrod, Busch,
Cooper, & Shapiro, 1997), Panic Control Therapy (Barlow, Raffa & Cohen, 2002), and Applied
Relaxation Training (Chambless, Schwalberg, Relaxation Therapy Manual). The subjects
compared in this investigation comprise patients who were diagnosed with primary panic
disorder by ADIS-IV-L with minimum severity (of 4/8) and did not have substance or alcohol
dependence, bipolar disorder, organic mental disorders or psychosis. I will compare RF scores
of patients with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, across Axis II disorder diagnoses,
nested in one of the three clusters of personality disorder, as defined by the DSM-IV-TR. These
comparison groups will be further detailed in the Results section.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This study examines the relationship between reflective function and personality
disorders in patients with primary panic disorder, with and without agoraphobia, recruited to a
psychotherapy research study. The following literature review is presented in four sections,
beginning with an overview of panic disorder, discussing treatment options as well as potential
considerations in non-response to first-line interventions. The second section will examine
issues regarding patients with personality disorders, and consider treatment complications posed
by co-occurring Axis I and Axis II disorders. The third section will review the concept of
mentalization and reflective functioning as it pertains to Axis I and II comorbidity. This section
will examine the theoretical basis for RF and reviews empirical research documenting the
relationship between RF and personality disorders. The fourth section will propose a
relationship between RF and the three clusters of personality disorders (which will be described
below).

PANIC DISORDER
Definition and Prevalence
A panic attack is defined by the DSM-IV-TR as a sudden or unexpected onset of intense
fear or discomfort, during which four or more physical symptoms occur for a discrete period of
time. Any combination of the following physical symptoms may include: racing heart, sweating,
trembling/shaking, shortness of breath, feeling of choking, chest pain/discomfort,
nausea/abdominal distress, dizziness/unsteady feeling, derealization/depersonalization, chills/hot
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flushes, numbness, fear of losing control, fear of going crazy and fear of dying. These symptoms
typically peak within ten minutes. A diagnosis of panic disorder is warranted if panic attacks
become recurrent over a period of one month or more, with at least one of following three
responses: unrelenting concern for further attacks, worry about the consequences of panic
attacks, especially on one’s mental or physical health, or a significant change in behavior to
avoid additional panic attacks. Panic disorder is specified to occur with or without agoraphobia.
Agoraphobia is defined as intense anxiety and persistent avoidance of situations or places from
which, in the event of a panic attack, obtaining help or escaping might be difficult.
Estimates of prevalence rates for panic disorder without agoraphobia have remained
relatively constant over time and across populations, and range from approximately 1-2% to
3.7% of adults (Yates, 2009; Kessler et. al, 2006). The lifetime prevalence of panic disorder
with agoraphobia is 1.1%, while 0.8% of the general population is estimated to suffer
agoraphobia without panic disorder following an isolated panic attack (Kessler et. al, 2006).
According to the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (Kessler, et al. 2005), 23% of
patients with panic disorder also have agoraphobia, although this number has been found to be as
high as one-third to one-half of panic patients (Yates, 2009). Almost a quarter of the general
population (22.7%) suffers from an isolated panic attack without going on to develop panic
disorder or agoraphobia. Panic disorder patients have been estimated to account for
approximately 21% of emergency room visits and are 12.6 times as likely to visit emergency
rooms as the general population, at considerable financial cost (Swinson et al., 1992; Markowitz
et al, 1989; Hunsley, 2003). They also have higher rates of morbidity and health care utilization
relative to patients with other psychiatric diagnoses and primary care patients without psychiatric
diagnoses (Korczak et al., 2007; Klerman et al, 1991; Katerndahl & Realini, 1995). Furthermore,
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the frequency with which panic attacks, and the suffering that even isolated panic attacks can
bring (Klerman et al., 1991), suggests that clinicians treating patients who experience only
temporary panic symptoms would benefit from complex understanding of this disorder
Development of panic disorder
Although there is general consensus in research regarding risk factors that contribute to
the development of panic attacks, the etiology of panic remains debatable. Panic disorder is
theorized to develop through a combination of constitutional genetic and temperamental factors
and environmental influences. Theoretical models have typically been formulated with the
purpose of indicating treatment recommendations, although at this time, no single theoretical
model has been found to be unifying and irrefutable in terms of causal or predictive dynamics. A
full accounting of the history of these theories would not be relevant to the aims of this study but
a brief summary of conceptualized mechanisms of panic disorder follow.
Psychiatric genetic studies have identified panic disorder is a heritable disease. First
degree relatives of participants in these studies with panic attacks have from three to twenty-one
fold higher lifetime risk of panic than relatives of participants without panic disorder (Smoller &
Tsuang, 1998). Furthermore, relatives of participants in these studies are more likely to suffer
from panic disorder than other forms of anxiety disorders (Fyer, 1995).
Temperamental variables have been identified as heritable phenotypes that predispose
individuals to the development of anxiety disorders. Among these variables are behavioral and
personality descriptors observed in children and adults prior to the development of panic
disorder. The presence of behavioral inhibition, a tendency in childhood to display fear, shyness
or avoidance of novel situations (Kagan, 1987), is associated with the development of anxiety
disorders (Craske & Waters, 2005; Smoller et al., 2005). Neuroticism is an adult personality trait
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(Eysenck, 1967; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Craske, 2001), characterized by high sensitivity and
vulnerability to negative emotion, and is associated with the onset of anxiety disorders. In a
hierarchical model, Craske and Waters (2005) proposed that the presence of behavioral
inhibition and neuroticism, with contributing genetic loading, cognitive and familial variables,
predispose an individual to development of some anxiety disorders, including panic disorder.
Psychotherapeutic theories on panic disorder
Cognitive behavioral theory
Cognitive behavioral therapy is a first-line psychotherapeutic intervention for panic
disorder with the most empirical support, although the most recent Practice Guidelines for Panic
Disorder from the American Psychiatric Association (2009) references the success of panicfocused psychodynamic psychotherapy (PFPP, Milrod, Busch, Cooper & Shapiro, 1997; Milrod,
et al., 2007) as an initial treatment in accordance with patient preference. In the cognitive
behavioral model of panic disorder, fear of panic attacks and their consequences produces a
general ‘fear of fear’, leading to anticipatory anxiety and phobic avoidance (Chambless &
Gracely, 1989). Interoceptive conditioning is identified as maintaining panic disorder, as
associative learning forges a link between transient or even normal bodily sensations and the
unpleasant experience of having a panic attack. Low-level bodily/somatic sensations of anxiety
or simple arousal become conditioned stimuli, which then elicit additional anxiety or panic. This
experience attenuates the body’s response to conditioned stimuli, further increasing vulnerability
to panic attacks (Craske and Waters, 2005). Therefore, cognitive behavioral treatments for panic
disorder use interoceptive exposure to ameliorate this conditioning.
Contributing to the “fear of fear,” panic disorder patients are thought to suffer from
“catastrophic misinterpretations” of bodily sensations (Clark, 1986). That is, normal bodily
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sensations are imbued with dangerous misinterpretation and meaning. Based on the characteristic
of ‘out of the blue’ panic attacks, implicit memories activate the amygdala, and these
interpretations may therefore take place at a conscious or unconscious level (Craske and Waters,
2005). Due to the perceived inability to control these feelings, patients become afraid of all
strong affects (Williams et al., 1997). This serves to support the overly sensitive responses of
patients to normal body sensations as they are prone to becoming overwhelmed by strong
emotions. Cognitive restructuring, as part of cognitive behavioral treatments, intends to modify
patients’ irrational thought patterns that lead to “catastrophic misinterpretation” (Craske and
Waters, 2005). Both pharmacological and cognitive behavioral therapies attempt to support
patients’ capacity for emotion regulation. CBT attempts to enhance executive functioning
through cognitive restructuring and lessening patients’ sensitivity and reactivity to anxiety
through exposure.
Psychodynamic theory
The psychodynamic approach to panic disorder emphasizes unconscious conflicts,
defensive coping styles, and disturbed object relational schemata that are theorized to underlie
the disorder and contribute to the severity of symptoms. This perspective does not contradict the
diathesis model, wherein a combination of physiological vulnerability and environmental factors
predispose a person to panic disorder (Busch et al., 1991; Milrod et al., 1997).
Although psychodynamic theories of panic disorder have evolved over time, the basis of
these ideas derives from Freud’s (1895) description of “anxiety neurosis” originating from
unconscious conflict. He theorized that the structure and process of anxiety neurosis arises out
of an “accumulation of excitation,” as a result of the “deflection of somatic sexual excitement.”
He observed affect dysregulation and ineffective management of strong impulses in these
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patients. Freud (1926) later revised his theory of anxiety, developing the idea of “signal anxiety,”
which was defined as a normal and adaptive mechanism in response to psychological threats.
This theory integrated the function of the ego in employing and managing defenses. Appropriate
levels of anxiety signal the ego to launch psychological defenses. In this way, signal anxiety
supports the ego in protecting itself from unconscious overwhelming affect. When the ego is not
successful in this process, traumatic levels of anxiety may occur. Panic attacks represent a
breakthrough of traumatic level anxiety. In this way, intrapsychic conflict is hypothesized to be
central in the development of panic symptoms. Symptoms are viewed as a compromise
formation between an unacceptable wish and the defense against that wish (Freud, 1926; Milrod
et al., 1997).
Freud’s theory on the function of signal anxiety has significantly contributed to the basis
for current psychodynamic understandings of the development of panic disorder. Failure of
signal anxiety is thought to cause a traumatic level of anxiety to flood the ego, resulting in panic
attacks (Diamond, 2004; Milrod et al., 1997; Busch et al., 1999). As hypothesized by Freud
(1926), signal anxiety is proposed to alert the ego to the presence of danger, but traumatic
anxiety is experienced as actual danger, overwhelming the ego’s capacity for symbolic
representation. The failure of signal anxiety may arise in cases of ego weakness, real trauma or
cumulative trauma. In this instance, cumulative trauma is described as repeated “micro” traumas,
often as a result of severe disturbances in the early relationship with the caregiver (Diamond,
2004). These disruptions interfere with the development of regulatory faculties, including the
symbolizing function of signal anxiety. Therefore, these individuals are more vulnerable to
being overwhelmed by flooding of emotions. This ego immaturity contributes to charged and

15

ambivalent experiences in separations and the development of autonomy, as the individual lacks
the ego strengths to function independently.
In one model integrating constitutional factors and parenting style, Shear and colleagues
(1993) suggested that some anxiety, particularly an avoidant defensive style, arises out of
vulnerabilities in temperament interacting with early relationship disruptions. They theorized
that “inborn fear of unfamiliar situations, augmented by frightening, overcontrolling parental
behaviors, predisposes [the individual] to incomplete resolution of conflicts between dependence
and independence” (p. 862). This perspective observes that some individuals who experience
panic attacks are prone to feeling suffocated by other people and they excessively seek a sense of
independence while others with panic are sensitive to separation and are excessively dependent
on others. In either case, one way of describing the object relational pattern of panic disorder
patients is weak representations of the self and powerful representations of the other. Defenses
remain directed toward maintaining a tolerable distance from others. In turn, this coping strategy
produces avoidance of unfamiliar situations and, cyclically, overvaluing threats while perceiving
the self as infantile and unable to manage situations.
Milrod et al. (1997) have further theorized on panic patients’ poor affect regulation to
note that disavowed anger becomes a dangerous and difficult emotion for patients with panic to
experience. This association develops as the child becomes angry and she perceives the parent’s
behavior to be rejecting or frightening. However, the child believes that the parent cannot
tolerate or survive her rage, and that it will destroy the parent or the parent’s relationship to the
child, a devastating and frightening loss for the dependent child. Due to this fear, the child
suppresses her rage. Any awareness of this rage contributes to further binding the child to the
parent, in an unconscious attempt to undo rageful fantasies. This process can establish a vicious
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cycle, as fear of loss can then increase the child’s dependency on the parent, leading to further
frustration and rage toward the parent, as the child views the parent as the source of her
inadequacies. The defense against unconscious anger is one aspect of the cycle of panic and is
further reinforced if the parent correspondingly resists the child’s attempts at independence. The
child may feel incomplete without the primary object and struggle to fully develop a separate,
coherent sense of self. Furthermore, the child can develop a sense of inadequacy if the parent
overtly or implicitly supports the belief that the child cannot tolerate separation (Busch et al.,
1999; Milrod et al., 1997).
As the child is faced with new developmental tasks, such as during the resolution of the
oedipal phase, this previously established fear of loss is reinforced by normative anger at the
parent. For these patients, it seems as if regression to a more dependent position is preferable to
the danger of facing greater autonomy (Shear et al., 1993; Milrod et al., 1997). As the child
grows into an adult, terror of autonomy reinforces the sense of inadequacy and emotional
dependence, which in turn maintains the reluctance to separate from attachment figures (Klass et
al., 2008). Thus, the panic patient enacts and reinforces her fear that she will not function
without the object.
In order to avoid experiencing painful emotions, the patient uses defenses of denying,
displacing or projecting negative affects (Rudden et al., 2008). Instead, attention is focused on
the physical symptoms of the panic attack, supporting the patient’s defense to distract from
emotional conflicts and intensity. The development of this physical and emotional disability
creates a perceived need for care from others (Busch et al., 1999). In this way, the patient is able
to avoid functioning independently, keeping important objects in caretaking roles. Panic
disorder patients demonstrate a failure in defenses to effectively cope with anxiety and rage.
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Psychodynamic theory of panic disorder emphasizes that the symptoms themselves carry
emotional significance. Milrod and colleagues (1997) argue that, while catastrophic
misinterpretation is typical in the development of panic disorder, specific constellations of
symptoms relate to specific underlying emotionally-driven meanings for individual patients.
Through the patient’s associations to the context of the panic attacks and specific symptoms, it is
possible to identify events or thoughts that triggered the attack. Patients’ associations to body
sensations often reveal body memories or unconscious fantasies that are psychologically
connected to the physical symptoms. These thoughts or fantasies are expressed somatically
(Milrod et al., 1997; Shear et al., 1993).
Psychotherapies for panic disorder
There are several known effective treatments for panic disorder. A number of
pharmacological agents and cognitive behavioral therapy are considered first line treatments
(American Psychiatric Association, 2007; Lydiard, Otto, Milrod, 2001). However, a subset of
patients does not respond or suffers relapse after receiving these therapies. In a multi-site study
of panic disorder, Barlow and colleagues (2000) compared the efficacy of CBT, imipramine,
their combination, placebo only, or CBT plus placebo. They found a 48.7% response rate to CBT
alone and 60.3% response rate for patients treated with a combination of medication and CBT
immediately following three months of treatment, dropping to 37.8% remission rate for CBT
alone and 57.1% for combination therapy following a six-month period of maintenance
treatment, dropping further to 31.9% for CBT alone and 26.3% for the combination group six
months after discontinuing therapy and medication.
In a small study (n= 44) of CBT for panic disorder, Marks and colleagues reported that
29% of subjects were classified as “nonresponders,” and continued to experience panic attacks
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following the end of the treatment (Marks et al., 1993). CBT has a good record of maintaining
therapeutic improvement for panic disorder (Brown & Barlow, 1995), however, a significant
proportion of patients have been found to relapse after response to all initially efficacious
treatments (Craske et al., 1991, Barlow et al., 2000).
Predictors of poor outcome, indicating greater level of anxiety symptoms and impaired
social adjustment following treatment among patients with panic disorder, include: presence of
personality disorders, severity of panic symptoms, phobic avoidance (agoraphobia), depression,
and female gender (Yates, 2009; Kessler et al., 2006; Pollack & Otto, 1997; Slap & den Boer,
2001; Pollack et al., 2000). Results of a study examining differences between male and female
patients with panic disorder on rates of co-occurring personality disorders found no gender
differences (Barzega et al., 2001). One study that specifically explored the co-occurrence of
Axis I and II disorders in female and male patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia
(Starcevic et al., 2008), found that women had a greater tendency to receive other comorbid Axis
I diagnoses, particularly other anxiety disorders, while men were more likely to meet criteria for
past alcohol abuse or dependence. No differences were found for the mean number of cooccurring Axis I and II diagnoses per patient. The only significant gender difference in Axis II
was a higher likelihood for women to meet criteria for dependent personality disorder.
Heterogeneity of panic disorder
These theories and accompanying techniques each describe the panic disorder patient
population assuming a relatively stable and uniform group. In fact, patients who meet DSM
criteria for primary panic disorder may represent a heterogeneous population, with a range of comorbid personality disorders or other Axis I disorders, particularly depression. While therapist
competence, therapy implementation and match compatibility with patient inevitably accounts
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for some variation in responses to the treatment of panic, another contributing factor to
differences in responses to treatment may be diversity within panic patient population. Further
data on differences between patients within this population may lead to better articulation of
treatment efficacy and help refine appropriate intervention selection.

PERSONALITY DISORDERS
Definition and prevalence
According to the DSM-IV-TR, personality disorders (PDs) are broadly defined as rigid or
ingrained maladaptive patterns of thinking, feeling or behaving. Such patterns have been
described as long in duration, leading to significant distress and impairment not better accounted
for by use of substances or another medical condition. Although this stability of the condition of
personality disorders has been the subject of debate (Skodol et al., 2005), especially with regard
to proposals for change to the DSM-5, this is generally considered a central feature of PDs. PDs
constitute a significant public health problem, as a result of associated functional impairment,
extensive treatment utilization, complications to treatments of other psychiatric disorders, such
as major depression, and suicide risk (Skodol et al., 2005).
As defined by the DSM-IV-TR, ten primary personality disorders have been identified
and are separated into three clusters: cluster A comprises the “odd” personality disorders
paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal PDs; cluster B comprises the “dramatic” personality
disorders anti-social, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic PDs; and cluster C comprises the
“anxious” personality disorders avoidant, dependent and obsessive compulsive PDs. Two other
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personality disorders, depressive personality disorder and passive-aggressive personality
disorder, are evaluated using the SCID II and were included in previous versions of the DSM
(the DSM-II and DSM-III-R, respectively). Although they are not currently included in Axis II,
they remain in Appendix B with other proposed disorders suggested for further study.
In Part II of the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) study of the general
population of the United States, personality disorder screening questions from the International
Personality Disorder Examination (IPDE) were administered (N = 5692). A probability subsample was then interviewed with the IPDE and used to link screening question responses with
IPDE clinical diagnoses. The method of Multiple Imputation (MI) was used to estimate
prevalence and correlates of PDs in the full sample. The 12-month MI prevalence estimates were
5.7% Cluster A, 1.5% Cluster B, 6.0% Cluster C, and 9.1% any PD (Lenzenweger et al., 2007).
For individual DSM-IV/IPDE personality disorders, prevalence estimates were taken from the
PD Clinical Reappraisal Sample (N = 214) and were approximated as follows : Paranoid PD
2.3% (SE=0.8), Schizoid PD 4.9% (SE=2.2), Schizotypal PD 3.3% (SE=2.0), Borderline PD
1.6% (SE=0.7), Antisocial PD 1.0% (SE=0.5), Histrionic PD 0.0% (SE=0.0), Narcissistic PD
0.0% (SE=0.0), Avoidant PD 5.2% (SE=1.6), Dependent PD 0.6% (SE=0.4), Obsessivecompulsive PD 2.4% (SE=0.8), and PD NOS 1.6% (SE=0.7). These estimates are likely to be
somewhat higher than in the population as there was a somewhat higher proportion of IPDE
screening questions endorsed in the clinical reappraisal sample than the full sample as well as
larger sample estimates (SEs) found in the clinical reappraisal sample than in the full Part II
NCS-R.
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Criticism and limitations of current personality disorder definitions
The DSM-IV-TR diagnostic system for personality disorders has been criticized for many
reasons. Limitations include the use of polythetic criteria rather than the identification of a
central criterion, leading to extreme heterogeneity among patients receiving the same diagnosis.
The number of criteria necessary for diagnosis of each personality disorder leads to potential
underrating of meaningful character pathology, requiring the use of the PD NOS category.
Furthermore, the current rating system of the DSM-IV-TR does not include a standard for
evaluating severity in personality disorder nor does it identify strengths or protections against
dysfunction (Tyrer, 2005; Skodol et al., 2005).
DSM-IV-TR diagnoses of personality disorders have been criticized for their vague
definitions and lack of basis in research. As defined in DSM-IV-TR, overlapping and vague
criteria may lead some personality disorder symptomatology to be subsumed under multiple
diagnostic categories, resulting in the diagnosis of multiple disorders (Clark, 2007; Oldham et
al., 1992; Zimmerman, Rothchild, & Chelminski, 2005). Alternatively, some symptoms may be
left out of diagnostic descriptions if full criteria for a given disorder are not met in favor of the
primary diagnosis. While these outcomes, either multiple comorbidities, or existing symptoms
not being reflected in any diagnosis, may be appropriate, there is little hierarchical accounting.
Other types of PDs, such as histrionic PD, have been found inadequately described as a valid and
separate diagnosis (Bakkevig & Karterud, 2010). Furthermore, the CLPS project findings called
into question the DSM-IV-TR defined stability of PD criteria (Grillo et al., 2000; Skodol et al.,
2005). The lack of specificity in the general definition of PD, pervasive co-occurrences among
DSM-IV-TR PDs, limited validity for some existing PDs, instability of current PD criteria, and
arbitrary diagnostic thresholds led the Personality and Personality Disorders Work Group to
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recommend a significant reorganization of the diagnostic process for personality disorders for the
DSM-5. However, despite years of debate and revision, no specific diagnostic changes were
adopted, although the multiaxial system itself was eliminated. Due to the above limitations of
the current diagnostic process of PDs, it would be useful in the ongoing debates to specify
characteristics associated with the current categories of PDs used in the DSM-IV-TR, and now
DSM-5. Further understanding of the interaction between what has been known as Axis I and II
might indicate patterns in personality and symptoms that make up different diagnostic
constellations.
Co-morbidity within Personality Disorders, Clusters A, B, and C
Personality disorders are among the most frequent disorders treated by psychiatrists
(Zimmerman et al. 2005). Estimates of those seeking outpatient treatment meeting criteria for
one of the 10 official DSM-IV-TR personality disorders range from approximately one third to
almost half of outpatients, taking into account patients diagnosed with PDNOS. Panic disorder is
associated with high rates of personality co-morbidity, estimated between 40% to 50% (Yates,
2000). Co-morbidity rates for being diagnosed with two or more personality disorders have
consistently been found to be high. According to Zimmerman et al. (2005), who evaluated 859
psychiatric outpatients, among patients who met criteria for at least one personality disorder,
60.4% met for more than one personality disorder and 25.2% met for two or more personality
disorders. The Part II NCS-R (Lenzenweger et al., 2007) also found significant comorbidity
within cluster, using tetrachoric correlations, and the following table (Table 1) adapted from
Lenzenweger et al. 2007) presents these correlations of comorbidity:
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Table 1. Correlations Among DSM-IV/IPDE PDs in the Clinical Reappraisal Sample n = 214)
NCS-R IPDE Clinical Data: Tetrachoric Correlation Estimate
CLUSTER B b

CLUSTER A

CLUSTER
A
PAR
S’OID
S’TYP
ANY A
CLUSTER
Bb
ANT
BOR
ANY B
CLUSTER
C
AVO
DEP
OCD
ANY C
Total
PD NOS

ANY
A

ANT

BOR

ANY
B

.13
.34
.27

.56a
.58a
.65a

---.64a
----

----

----

.53a
-.86a
.49
.46a

.60a
.03
.49a
.55a

.05
-.83a
.45
.24

.54a
.82a
.67a
.55a

.44
.77a
.59a
.45

PAR

S’OID

S’TYP

.77a
.48
----

.96a
----

----

.73a
.76a
.83a

-.84a
.56a
.46

.70a
.20
.59a
.67a

.55a
-.84a
.40
.49a

CLUSTER C

AVO

DEP

OCD

.70a
.63a
----

.80a
----

----

ANY
C

.55
-.89a
-.10
.37
.90a
.55
.82a
-.27
-.79a
.64a
.43
NCS-R, National Comorbidity Survey Replication; PAR, paranoid; S’OID, schizoid; S’TYP,
schizotypal; ANY A, any cluster A PD; ANT, antisocial; BOR, borderline; ANY B, any cluster B PD;
AVO, avoidant; DEP, dependent; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; ANY C, any cluster C PD.
a Significant at the .05 level, two-sided test.
b Note that Narcissistic and Histrionic PDs were not included in the table in the original article
(Lenzenweger et al., 2007)

Dividing the ten personality disorders into three clusters as discrete and separate elements
has been examined for validity through factor analysis (Kass et al. 1985; Hyler & Lyons, 1988).
The use of the three clusters has been consistently found to support the grouping of personality
disorders into categories showing similar clinical characteristics. The exception to this finding
has been obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD), as factor analytic studies have
found it to constitute a separate component from the three clusters, despite its continued
designation as a cluster C personality disorder (Skodol et al., 2005; Kass et al., 1985; Morey et
al., 1986).
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Treatment of personality disorders
Research into psychotherapy outcomes for personality disorders has been fairly limited.
Primarily, there have studies on the treatment of Borderline PD, with more recent examinations
of other personality disorders, those in cluster C in particular. According to the “Practice
Guideline for the Treatment of Patients With Borderline Personality Disorder” (2001), two
psychotherapeutic approaches have been shown in randomized controlled trials to have efficacy:
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic therapy (such as Mentalization-Based Therapy (MBT)) and
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT). Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP) has also been
studied for the treatment of individual Borderline PD and comorbid Narcissistic and Borderline
PDs (Diamond et al., 2013).
Svartberg et al. (2004) designed a randomized controlled trial comparing short-term
psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive therapy for 40 weekly sessions for adult outpatients
(ages 18-65 years) with cluster C personality disorders (N = 51). 54% of patients from the shortterm psychodynamic therapy group and 42% of patients from the cognitive psychotherapy group
were considered “recovered” for psychiatric symptoms on the Global Severity Index of the SCL90 (Derogotis, 1983), and 40% of patients showed significant improvement in personality
pathology in both groups. Despite these impressive changes, a sizeable number of patients did
not significantly improve and the authors suggested that “factors other than treatment modality
may discriminate better between successful and poor outcomes.” A better understanding of the
makeup of patients with Axis I and II disorders may give information about the changes that
patients undergo, and therefore guide further refinement of therapeutic interventions.
One randomized control trial (Vinnars et al., 2005) compared 40 sessions of manualized
time-limited supportive-expressive psychotherapy (SEP; Luborsky, 1984) to a nonmanualized
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community-delivered psychodynamic treatment (CDPT) for patients with any personality
disorder (N = 156). The researchers found reduction of psychiatric symptoms based on the
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90), general personality disorder severity and improvement in
general psychosocial functioning in both treatment groups at termination and maintained at
follow-up. The authors accounted for severity in personality disorders on the SCID-II, by
creating a dimensional index, summarizing all of the positive criteria on Axis II, resulting in a
scale that ranged from 0 to 93. In this way, they attempted to address the categorical diagnostic
system of the SCID-II, in its use of arbitrary cutoff points for demarcation of personality
disorders.

CO-MORBIDITY OF PANIC AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS
Several models have been proposed to describe the relationship between Axis I disorders
and personality disorders. Much of the longitudinal research into the interaction of personality
disorders and Axis I best fits in the framework of the "pathoplasty" model, which does not
assume a shared etiology, but rather emphasizes the influence of one disorder on the presentation
or course of the other (Shea et al., 2004). Some studies have found evidence through self-reports
of a particular directional effect in this interaction, that is, the impact of an acute Axis I disorder
on presentation of personality traits or disorders and vice versa (Widiger, Verheul, & van den
Brink, 1999).
Particularly relevant to panic disorder patients are the cluster C personality disorders.
The personality disorders in cluster C, which includes Avoidant PD (AVPD), Dependent PD
(DPD), and Obsessive Compulsive PD (OCPD), share a common factor of fearfulness (Fossati et
al., 2006). For AVPD, the core fear is of negative evaluation, for DPD, the core fear is of
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separation, and for OCPD, the fear is of not having personal and interpersonal control. In a study
on anxiety disorders, high rates of comorbidity between Generalized Anxiety Disorder and the
cluster C personality disorders were found by Massion el al. (2002), AVPD: 20%, DPD: 10%
and OCPD: 9%, as well as Social Phobia and cluster C, AVPD: 35%, DPD: 6% and OCPD: 7%.
These are the most common PDs found for panic disorder patients (Friborg, et al., 2013). A
recent PsycInfo meta-analysis identified 118 papers published between 1980 and 2010 from
English or German speaking sources with relevant criteria of primary anxiety disorders for
patients over 18-years-old with comorbid personality disorders (Friborg et al., 2013). The
authors estimated that for panic disorder without agoraphobia 41% of patients met criteria for
any comorbid PD, 14% for cluster A PDs, 16% for cluster B PDs, and 22% for cluster C PDs.
For panic disorder with agoraphobia, 47% of patients met criteria for any comorbid PD, 11% for
cluster A PDs, 20% for cluster B PDs, and 38% for cluster C PDs. Proportions for specific PDs
are below in Table 2, adapted from Friborg et al (2013):

Table 2: Comorbid proportions of specific PDs for panic disorder based on a random
effects model.
Anxiety
Disorder

Panic no
Agora
Panic
w/Agora

PD
PAR

S’OID

.06
439
9
.07
1955
21

.04
431
8
.02
2001
17

S’TYP

ANT

BOR

HIS

NAR

AVO

.04
514
9
.02
2000
17

.04
341
6
.03
1813
18

.10
515
11
.06
2426
21

.11
542
11
.08
2612
23

.05
486
9
.05
2320
22

.15
594
11
.17
3045
28

DEP
.13
528
11
.13
2747
26

OCD
.09
641
11
.11
2694
25

Note: Reported data(ex:.06.) represent mean proportion of personality disorders. Total sample
size and number of studies [ex:439 and 9] are reported on the lines immediately following.
PAR, paranoid; S’OID, schizoid; S’TYP, schizotypal; ANT, antisocial; BOR, borderline; HIS,
histrionic; NAR, narcissistic; AVO, avoidant; DEP, dependent; OCD, obsessive-compulsive
disorder; A, Agoraphobia.
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The impact of co-morbid Axis II disorders on the treatment of panic disorder
Generally, five variables have been associated with poorer treatment outcome responses
among panic disorder patients: severity of panic disorder, the presence/severity of agoraphobia,
comorbid depression, female gender, the history of separation anxiety disorder, and the presence
a personality disorder (Pollack et al., 2000). Severe agoraphobia has been linked to greater
incidence of Axis II diagnosis as well as greater levels of severity of personality pathology
(Shear et al, 2004). However, the nature of the relationship between severe agoraphobia and
personality disorder is inconclusive and does not seem predictive (Brooks, Baltazar & Munjack,
1989). The effect of personality disorders on outcome of pharmacological treatment in patients
with panic disorder is subject to debate in the research literature. In a review of
pharmacotherapy treatments for panic disorder, Slaap and den Boer (2001) concluded that
personality disorders, or even personality traits are the most robust predictor of nonresponse.
However, this effect has been disputed in other studies (Clair et al., 1992; Hoffman et al., 1998;
Massion et al., 2002; Tony et al., 2000; Kampman et. al., 2008). Of particular debate is whether
any PD or only specific PDs negatively affect response to pharmacological treatment (Massion et
al., 2002; Tony et al., 2000; O'Rourke et al., 1996, Berger et al., 2004). Marchesi et al. (2006)
suggest that different findings regarding the influence of personality disorders on the
pharmacological treatments of panic disorder may be due to both differences in methodologies
(self-report versus structured interview) and the duration of the periods examined in the studies.
The negative impact of personality disorders is less likely to be found after a short-term followup (less than three months) (Slaap & den Boer, 2001). Furthermore, a combination of any cluster
C PD and the severity of panic disorder with agoraphobia has been identified as the most
significant predictor of suicidal ideation (Starcevic et al., 1999).
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In a study of 347 outpatients with a primary anxiety disorders, at least 35% were found to
have a personality disorder, with 27% meeting criteria for a cluster C disorder (Sanderson et al.,
1994). Patients with panic disorder and comorbid personality disorder typically have higher
levels of panic severity. In a treatment study of 173 patients, participants with one or more
comorbid personality disorders displayed higher baseline and higher post CBT treatment scores
across multiple indices of panic disorder severity compared to those without personality
disorders (Telch, Kamphuis, and Schmidt, 2011).
In one study isolating the effect of personality traits on treatment for panic disorder using
two types of SSRIs, only borderline traits (based on SCID-II evaluations) had a negative impact
on remission (Marchesi et al., 2006). Patients were evaluated once monthly over the course of
one year. In this study, remission was defined as the absence of full or limited symptom panic
attacks, anticipatory anxiety, phobic avoidance and depression for three months. The total
number of traits of each personality cluster did not affect outcome. As several variables have
been found to negatively affect treatment of panic disorder (Slaap & den Boer, 2001), the authors
excluded the effects of female gender, age at onset, duration of disorder, pre-treatment severity
of symptoms and Axis I comorbidity, isolating borderline traits to be a predictable variable in
nonresponse to SSRI pharmacotherapy for panic disorder.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) practice guideline (2009) recommends
psychodynamic psychotherapy for panic disorder patients with comorbid personality disorders
based on pilot research from Milrod et al. (2007). As coping strategies across PDs tend to be
limited and maladaptive, patients with co-morbid Axis I disorders may have increased
symptomatology in both severity and scope (Van Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999). In a study
making a three-way comparison among patients with pure anxiety disorders, patients with pure
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depressive disorders, and patients with both anxiety and depressive disorders, prevalence rates
for PDs were highest for the anxious/depressed group, who were diagnosed with more avoidant,
dependent, paranoid and borderline PDs (Van Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999). Oldham et al.
(1995) found that there are significant odds that when a personality disorder is present, a mood,
anxiety, psychotic, or eating disorder is also present. Although treatment outcomes for
individuals with a personality disorder vary depending on PD diagnosis (Bender et al., 2001),
generally the presence of personality disorders is a negative predictor of outcome (Reich et al.,
1993; Oldham et al., 1995). Understanding the nature and impact of the compounding effect on
Axis I symptoms that seems to accompany character pathology will give clinicians and
researchers a better sense of the challenges in treating different patients.
Co-morbidity has repeatedly been suggested to have a negative impact on treatment
processes (Kennard et al, 2005), although this is not universal. In order to make sense of unique
effects of particular patterns of co-morbidity on panic treatment interventions, assessment of
clinically significant co-occurrences will be necessary (Starcevic, 2005). However, this type of
study is complicated and controversial, in that there is evidence that is difficult to accurately
evaluate a person’s long-term personality traits during an acute phase of panic disorder
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005). Panic disorder may exacerbate or exaggerate personality
difficulties (Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005), with some evidence suggesting that high neuroticism,
or a tendency to experience negative emotions often precedes the onset of anxiety disorders.
However, the nature and direction of the relationship between personality difficulties and anxiety
disorders is not fully understood, with some suggesting that the adverse effect of personality
traits on the treatment response for panic disorder has been overstated and overgeneralized
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005).
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MENTALIZATION AND REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING
The construct of mentalization is described by Peter Fonagy and colleagues (2002) as
“the process by which we realize that having a mind mediates our experience of the world.”
Mentalization is briefly defined as the imaginative capacity to reflect on internal experience, a
social cognitive ability to imagine one’s own feelings and behavior and to reasonably speculate
on the motivations and behaviors of other people (Fonagy & Target, 2006). Fonagy posits that
mentalization is intrinsic to the development of the self, and fundamental to human interaction.
Mentalization is an integration of research into “theory of mind” with attachment theory and
psychoanalytic concepts. Fonagy has suggested that “the failure of mentalizing (social
cognition) to be a vulnerability factor for a range of psychopathologies, particularly PDs”
(Chiesa & Fonagy, 2013).
Borne out of philosophical debates regarding the understanding of one’s own and others’ minds,
theory of mind was first studied as cognitive process, a primary deficit in autism, as an inability
to take another person’s perspective (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985). Mentalizing theory was
initially described in the context of the formulation of mentalization-based treatment (MBT) for
BPD in a partial hospitalization setting (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; Bateman & Fonagy, 2008;
Bateman & Fonagy 2004). Fonagy and colleagues (2002) expanded on the basic concept of
theory of mind to include a range of interpersonal functions that require an appreciation of the
emotional mind, with distinct and understandable mental states that underlie observable behavior
(Slade, 1999; Slade, et al., 2005). Mentalization reflects a complex affective and interpersonal
understanding of oneself and others, and suggests capacities that enable an individual to develop
an enriched stable sense of self and to effectively navigate the social world.

31

Awareness and insight into mental states allows for greater control over emotional
experiences by creating a complex context and multiple perspectives for feelings and reactions.
Healthy mentalization functions in the consolidation of the self, as it is critical to both identity
development and affect regulation. Through understanding that emotions are internally generated
rather than an externally imposed force, self-regulation becomes more available as a means for
greater autonomy in affectively charged circumstances. The compounding benefits of this
psychological capacity is described by Slade et al. (2005), as being able to separate what is
internal to the self from particular contributions from the other may support “productive,
intimate, and sustaining relationships,” capable of feeling connected to others but separate at the
same time. In turn, individuals with poor mentalization capacity may have weaknesses in their
sense of a self, in their capacity to tolerate strong emotions, and in their facility to form healthy
interpersonal relationships.
Theoretical underpinnings of mentalization
Although mentalization theory primarily grew out of attachment theory research, as first
pioneered by British psychoanalyst, John Bowlby (1969, 1980), Fonagy & Allison (2014) have
argued that the mechanism of mentalization encompasses “the developmental significance of the
transmission of epistemic trust in relation to social learning in the attachment context.” To
clarify the complex and far-reaching implications of this developmental theory, each of these
components needs to be described and explored. Attachment theory assumes that there is a
universal and inborn human proclivity to form close bonds with others. In the formation of these
bonds, attachment behaviors by an infant, such as smiling or clinging, are reciprocated by adult
attachment behaviors, such as holding or soothing, which in turn strengthens and reinforces the
attachment behaviors of the infant. Sroufe (1996) suggested that the primary objective of the

32

attachment system is the experience of security, which would be, among other outcomes, a
necessary foundation for regulating human experience. The infant is externally regulated by his
caregiver as he communicates changes in his state which are then understood and responded to
by his caregiver. The child learns that the caregiver will help him should he be aroused beyond
his coping capabilities and will soothe and aid him in recovering. Experiences over time with
the caregiver are aggregated and layered into representational systems, termed “internal working
models” by Bowlby (1973).
Based on Bowlby’s theory, Ainsworth et al. (1978) conducted controlled studies of infant
attachment patterns, attempting to identify these representational systems. She developed “the
strange situation,” in which she observed separations and reunions between mothers and their
infants, thereby activating responses along a continuum of security and fear. Ainsworth
categorized infants’ responses as representing three different types of attachment patterns:
secure, preoccupied, and avoidant. She theorized that the attachment system is triggered by fear,
while security facilitates exploration. Secure infants feel confident in the availability and
trustworthiness of the primary attachment figure and will therefore feel comfortable exploring.
Ainsworth et al. (1978) emphasize the importance of this “secure base” for the infant’s
development of his identity and his sense of his caregiver. One of the protections of secure
attachment, according to Ainsworth, is managing the activation of the attachment system.
Infants with preoccupied or avoidant attachment classifications, also known as insecure
attachment, do not have efficient strategies for managing their attachment needs and therefore
suffer from chronic activation of the attachment system.
Expanding on Ainsworth’s theories, Main and Solomon (1990) created an additional
category of insecure attachment, “disorganized” attachment for infants who do not seem to have
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a coherent strategy for managing the activation of the attachment system. These infants do not
fit into Ainsworth’s categories of secure, avoidant or preoccupied. These children seem confused
as to whether to approach or avoid the caregiver during times of stress, which can particularly
occur if the caregiver is the cause of fear, making the baby’s natural impulse to seek closeness
maladaptive (Main & Hess, 2000). These children may exhibit behaviors such as appearing
“dazed,” freezing, rocking, or show contradictory actions, such as approaching the caregiver but
with their back turned. A disorganized attachment classification has been theorized to be a risk
factor for severe psychiatric disturbances in childhood and adulthood, particularly borderline
personality disorder (Fonagy et al., 1996; Homes 2004; Nakash-Eisikovits, Dutra & Westen,
2002). Main and Goldwyn (1994; 1995) developed the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) to
classify the attachment of adults, asking about the subject’s early relationships with the important
caregivers.
Critical to the development of mentalization is the construction of an increasingly
sophisticated sense of self through emergent levels of agency in the context of the relationship
with one’s primary caregiver (Slade, 2005). In this model (2002), the development of the self
requires early differentiated physical representation, social affective-communicative interactions,
basic and then more complex understanding of goal-directed rational intentionality, and the
development of abstraction and temporality, allowing for the emergence of an “autobiographical
self.” These cognitive, psychological, and developmental lines are considered normal, with a
spectrum of psychopathology arising from the developmental distortion of the self as agent.
The Reflective Function Scale
The Reflective Function (RF) scale is an operationalized measurement of the set of
mental actions behind mentalization. Fonagy et al., (1998) developed an RF scoring system for
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use with the AAI to assess a person’s capacity to understand mental states in themselves or
others. Fonagy and colleagues found that a mother’s capacity to reflect on her own parents is
correlated to her child’s attachment classification and her attachment style. In other words,
mothers with high RF scores were more likely to be classified as secure and more likely to have
children classified as secure than mothers with low RF scores (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al.,
1998). They hypothesized that a mother’s capacity to understand and make meaning of her
child’s mental states functions critically in her child’s emotional development, as the child learns
about mental states by having his own mind reflected back to him by his mother (Fonagy et al.,
2002). The mother’s capacity to mentalize makes her child’s and her own behavior fairly
predictable. This process serves to engender a feeling of security for the child and supports his
growing sense of self and his ability to feel able to manage his emotional experience.
Slade and colleagues (2005) conducted research following Fonagy’s hypothesis that RF
mediates the intergenerational transmission of attachment status. They adapted an RF scoring
system for use with the Parent Development Interview (PDI), a semi-structured interview that
specifically assesses the mother’s representation of her child (Slade et al., 2004). In a sample of
40 mothers with babies, Slade and colleagues demonstrated that maternal RF is significantly
related to infant attachment status. Their results supported the idea that maternal reflective
function mediates the relationship between the mother’s attachment and the infant’s attachment.
The mother’s ability to transmit both attachment security and capacity for RF inextricably
influences the child’s social and emotional development.
However, Fonagy has recently changed focus on the use of attachment in the
development of mentalization, citing the theory of natural pedagogy, developed by Csibra and
Gergley (2009) to explain how attachment history creates distinct epistemic states, or conditions
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for communication of interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge. In this theory, human
communication is primarily an evolutionary imperative, required for the transmission of
cognitively opaque cultural knowledge. Ostensive cues trigger a special mode of learning in the
infant, in which the child feels that the subsequent communication will contain information that
is specifically relevant that is encoded with other knowledge relevant to social situations. A
securely attached child will believe that his/her caregiver is a reliable source of knowledge
because of this history of communication, in part through consistent emotional responses (Csibra
& Gergley, 2011. Fonagy and Allison (2014) have more recently argued that:
although attachment may be a key mechanism for mediating
epistemic trust, it is secondary to an underlying biological process
preserved by evolution. In other words, secure attachment is
unlikely to be necessary for generating epistemic trust but it may
be sufficient to do so, and, further, it is the most pervasive
mechanism in early childhood because it is a highly evolutionarily
effective indicator of trustworthiness (Fonagy & Allison, 2014, p.
374).
As demonstrated by Fonagy and colleagues during the development of the RF scoring
system (Fonagy et al., 1991), there is a wide range in the capacity of individuals to mentalize.
As currently theorized, this spectrum is a result of the individual differences in the early dyadic
relationship of mother and infant. Disruptions in the attachment relationship, regardless of the
reason, may hinder the development of mentalization in the child. As mentalization is posited to
be fundamental in the development of the sense of self and in self-regulation, impairment of this
capacity will disrupt the developing capacity for object relations and affect regulation (Fonagy et
al., 2002; Slade et al., 2005; Fonagy & Target, 2006).
During normal development, the infant develops an awareness of himself as a separate
self through communication with significant caregivers. This process begins with
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communication of physical needs, which begins to consolidate the infant’s physical self.
Through the mother’s early mirroring of the infant’s responses, the child develops a basic
emotional self. The infant learns to recognize that the mother’s mirroring reflects something that
comes from within. Fonagy and colleagues (2002) emphasize the importance of “high but
imperfect contingencies” as a kind of mirroring that supports the healthy development of affect
recognition and regulation. The mother mirrors the child in such a way that is slightly modified
and elaborated on the emotions of the child. In this way, the mother “marks” the emotion and
communicates that the mother understands and empathizes with the child’s emotions (Bateman
& Fonagy, 2004).
In presenting a slightly altered and heightened version of the emotion, the child moves
toward a second order representation of affect, building on a cognitive appraisal component. The
parent allows the child to develop a secondary representation of primary affect states, as the
parent communicates a metabolized version of the affect. This exaggerated version, mirrored to
the child should be experienced by the child as a representation of the child’s affect and not the
affect itself, allowing the child to differentiate his own affect from the parent’s affect. This
process ultimately teaches the child to recognize affect that is internally generated as distinct
from the affect of others (Fonagy et al., 2002). Fonagy and colleagues refer to the experience of
anxiety specifically, as a “confusing mixture of physiological changes, ideas and behaviors.”
The mother organizes the child’s experience by reflecting back the child’s anxiety so he knows
what he is feeling. These interactions between mother and child organize different internal states
in knowable and containable mental states. The mother’s representation of the child’s affect is
assumed by the child and is “mapped onto the representation of his self-state.” These different
self-states consolidate into a sense of self.
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Direct reflection on the part of the mother that too literally mirrors the child’s emotion
without marking it is experienced as the caregiver’s affect, not the infant’s. Inaccurate reflection,
direct reflection, or an absence of reflection may work to keep the baby’s feelings unsymbolized,
and therefore confusing, perhaps uncontainable and even frightening. Bateman and Fonagy
(2004) further hypothesize that if the caregiver does not appropriately mirror the child’s affects,
the child is deprived of the feeling of being known, which can interrupt the process of self-object
differentiation. The experience of being safe with one’s feelings allows the child to feel capable
of being regulated. Chronic experiences of being “unknown, obliterated or dysregulated create
feelings of danger, insecurity or falseness and unreality” (Slade, 2002, p. 2).
When the mother is unable to reflect affect to the infant, creating an emotional scaffold
for the child, the earliest stages of self development are disrupted. Often parents who are unable
to facilitate this process have deficits or disruptions in mentalization, whether due to interfering
illness or due to their own childhood trauma and are unable to regulate their own strong
emotions, and may expose their children to abuse or volatile environments. As a result the child
is not supplied with an important psychological protective tool and is burdened with greater
emotional trauma. If the child feels that his own mind or the mind of the caregiver is
overwhelming or otherwise intolerable, the child may actively avoid reflection as it is too
threatening. In this way, a deficit in mentalization is a developmental failure but also represents
a defense against unbearable feelings.
Fonagy and Bateman (2006) describe the relationship between mentalization and affect
regulation as a mutually influencing process that influences and shapes the formation of healthy
self-object representations. They suggest that an individual who is constitutionally vulnerable
who then experiences developmental trauma will have an unstable representation of self. In an
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attempt to cope with this destabilization, the individual will rely on early psychological
mechanisms, such as primitive defenses, to organize emotional experiences. This type of
disturbance impedes emotional development, as what Fonagy and Target (2006) term the
mentalizing self is critical to increasingly sophisticated types of affect regulation. They note that
rudimentary affect regulation is a prelude and required for the development of mentalization, but
once mentalization occurs, the capacity for and nature of affect regulations expands.
Mentalization supports the transformation of affect states, and more importantly, is used to
regulate the self, as the “child’s capacity to create a coherent image of mind depends on an
experience of being perceived as a mind by the attachment figure” (p. 554, Fonagy & Target,
2006). The infant’s capacity to self-soothe evolves into the ability to keep a stable sense of self
and use this stability in supporting emotion regulation.
As Fonagy and Target (2006) hypothesize, in order for mentalization to fully develop,
the child needs the attachment system to not be regularly activated. The dysregulation and
arousal created by the activation of the attachment system does not allow the child to have the
emotional or cognitive space to make sense of the world or richly develop the concept of mind.
An insecurely attached child bears a more chronic state of hyperarousal, and as a result, may
expend emotional resources to self regulate and make sense of an unpredictable caregiver, not
leaving sufficient reserves to develop a mentalizing self, in reflecting on or making meaning of
reality. A childhood environment which most supports the development of mentalization should
also support the child’s ability to explore, play, learn, and freely understand himself in a safe
environment. In this way, the environment that produces mentalization, as well as the
subsequent healthy mentalization itself play a crucial role in the consolidation of the self, critical
to identity development and affect regulation, allowing for more effective coping in the face of
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stress. Individuals with lower mentalization capacity may have serious disturbances in their
sense of self and ability to manage strong emotions, which may, in turn, interfere with
interpersonal relationships.
Lower RF scores have been found to be correlated to borderline personality disorder
(BPD) and other psychiatric difficulties. In a study of 82 inpatients, patients with a diagnosis of
BPD were significantly more likely to have low RF scores than average or above average RF
scores (Fonagy et al., 1996; Fonagy et al., 1998). Fonagy and colleagues’ theorize that
underlying much of the pathology of BPD is a failure to symbolize affect states in the context of
attachment relationships (Fonagy et al., 2002; Bateman & Fonagy 2004), which would be
represented in a failure to mentalize. Bateman and Fonagy assume this skill was underdeveloped
or fails because the child did not experience effective marking and contingent mirroring, and
therefore did not learn to distinguish between the caregiver’s affect state and his own state. Even
if the affect state reflected to child by the parent does not match with the child’s affective
experience, the child may still internalize these representations, including identifications of the
self as bad or destructive, creating an “alien self.” According to Bateman and Fonagy (2004), as
adults, patients with BPD struggle to view themselves and others as separate beings and either
merge with good aspects of the other, or project these alien aspects of self on to the other, in
order to create and maintain a sense of continuity within the self. In addition, patients with BPD
actively, defensively inhibit thinking about the mental states of self and others, as “these
experiences have led them to experiences of unbearable pain.” Chiesa and Fonagy (2013) found
that lower RF scores were associated with both childhood adversity, defined as abuse and
neglect, and PDs. As mentalization becomes protective during times of stress, individuals with
deficits in mentalization will be comparatively further destabilized by stress. Inhibition of
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mentalization may be adaptive in an abusive child-parent relationship, as sharing a mind with
disturbed and abusive parent can be destabilizing. However, this adaptive defense also results in
an ego weakness, leaving patients with BPD more prone to emotional lability and poor coping
strategies. Lacking the ability to create a secondary representation of affect states, patients with
impairments in RF may act out as both a failure in affect regulation and for the purpose of
expressing internal states. When RF is not impaired, it serves as a resource to protect against
trauma related emotional difficulties.
Reflective Function, symptomatology and psychotherapy
Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) compared mentalization to similar concepts such as
empathy, mindfulness, psychological mindedness, and affect consciousness. When comparing
these five concepts, they did find conceptual distinctions across dimensional dichotomies of
implicit and explicit modes of mentalizing, the facility of self-oriented mentalization versus
other-oriented mentalization, and the integration of cognitive-affective aspects of both process
and content of understanding mental states. In the Handbook of Menatlizing in Mental Health
Practice (2012), Bateman, Fonagy and Luyten emphasize differences in the self- versus otheroriented mentalization. These differences may manifest in three possible forms: impaired
mentalizing about both the self and others; marked imbalances in mentalizing about the self and
other; and imbalances in different way of mentalizing about the self and others.
As a caveat to the expanding inquiry into the utility of RF in the development of effective
treatments, Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) emphasize that the validity of the RF measure is
underdeveloped. Furthermore, they suggest that a deeper understanding of the relationship of RF
to borderline personality disorder and other diagnostic groups would elucidate the concept and
usefulness in treatment development. RF has been investigated in outcome research studies for
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the treatment of borderline personality disorder (Levy et al., 2006; Yoemans et al., 2008;
Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Although mentalizing theory was
developed within the context of the formulation of mentalization-based treatment (MBT),
Fonagy & Allison (2014) have argued that MBT has grown into a comprehensive approach to
the understanding and treatment of personality disorder more broadly across clinical settings.
Further, they posit that mentalization may be usefully described as a “common factor across
different forms of effective psychotherapy.
Levy and colleagues (2006) assessed the changes in attachment organization and
reflective function for three types of year-long psychotherapy treatments for BPD: transferencefocused psychotherapy (TFP), dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) and a modified
psychodynamic supportive psychotherapy. Significant improvements in RF and narrative
coherence were observed in patients treated with TFP, changes not found for other treatment
conditions. In an earlier paper from the same study, Clarkin et al, (2006) found that TFP was
related to reductions in aggression, as well as depression, anxiety, anger and suicidality.
However, the nature of the relationship between RF and these symptoms is an understudied
aspect of clinical research. The study of RF within the context of clinical trials might give
insight into differences among people with various symptoms in combination with personality.
Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2010) examined the relationship between personality
organization, using the Structured Interview of Personality Organization (STIPO; Clarkin et al.,
2004), RF, using the Adult Attachment Interview, and the number of Axis I or Axis II diagnoses
in a sample of 92 female borderline outpatients. The STIPO is a semistructured version of
Kernberg’s clinical Structural Interview (1984). It examines seven dimensions of personality
functioning: identity consolidation, quality of object relations, use of primitive defenses,
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character rigidity versus adaptive coping, quality of aggression, moral values and reality testing.
Each dimension is derived from a question-based scoring method, with clinical ratings for each
dimension ranging from absence of pathology to very severe pathology. Furthermore, an
assessment of the level of personality organization, normal, neurotic (neurotic 1 or 2), or
borderline (borderline 1 to 3) is made. Thus, descriptors of borderline 1, 2 or 3 refer to different
levels of personality organization. They found significant correlations between level of
personality organization and number of Axis I or Axis II disorders and a moderate association
between RF and level of personality organization. However, they found no association between
the number of Axis I or Axis II disorders and RF. This finding was in contrast to an earlier study
by these researchers (Bouchard et al., 2008), which showed lower levels of mentalization to be
significantly associated with the severity of both Axis I and Axis II pathology in a heterogeneous
clinical and nonclinical sample.
As noted above, other than studies on borderline personality disorder, literature on the
relationship between RF and psychopathology is sparse. Fischer-Kern and colleagues have
conducted two studies examining the relationship between Axis I disorders and RF (FischerKern et al, 2013; Fischer-Kern et al, 2010). In a study of 46 inpatients with major depressive
disorder, RF was scored using the AAI, and compared with that of 20 “healthy” controls. The
authors found highly impaired RF in severe chronically depressed inpatients as compared to the
controls. Furthermore, patients with comorbid depression and dependent personality disorder
had higher RF scores than those with depression alone, while those with comorbid depression
and schizoid personality disorder had lower RF scores than those with depression only (FischerKern et al., 2013). Ward et al (2001) observed a lower level of general RF in 20 inpatients with
anorexia nervosa in comparison to a healthy control group. These findings may also be
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considered consistent with research by Rastam et al. (1997) observed a subset of anorectic
patients that may have difficulty identifying and communicating feeling states, although they
used a measure of alexithymia to characterize this group.
A study by Rudden, Milrod, Target, Ackerman, and Graf (2006) noted that RF in 49
panic disorder patients was not impaired. However, Rudden et al. (2006) also measured PanicSpecific RF (PSRF), a scale derived from semistructured interview to elicit the patients’
understanding of the connection between aspects of their inner lives and their symptoms,
analogous to general RF yet targeting preoccupying symptoms. The authors found that mean
PSRF scores were significantly lower than mean general RF scores, signifying that the patients
were not impaired overall in their measured ability to mentalize, but were impaired with regard
to reflection on their panic symptoms.
Bouchard et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between various measures of
mentalization, attachment status and the severity of Axis I and II pathology. Twenty-two
participants were assessed for Axis I and II diagnoses using the SCID-I and SCID-II and RF
using the AAI. Using hierarchical multiple regression, RF was shown to be associated with the
number of Axis I and II diagnoses, as well as their severity in a mixed sample of both clinical
and non-clinical populations. Lower RF was associated with greater severity of both Axis I and
II pathology, particularly among patients with primary Axis II disorders. In a sample of 24
female inpatients, Muёller et al. (2006) assessed RF and used the “structure” Axis of the
operationalized psychodynamic diagnosis (OPD; OPD Task Force, 2001) as a measure of
personality. The OPD concept of “structure” closely relates to Kernberg’s model of personality
organization and is assessed on six dimensions (self-perception, self-regulation, defense, object
perception, communication, and attachment). The authors found a high positive correlation
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between “structure” and RF in a mixed clinical sample. However, the power of RF to predict
positive therapy outcome was largely independent of its relationship to this Axis on the OPD.

Current study
This study will investigate the relationship between reflective functioning and personality
disorders in patients with primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia. The
intention of this research is to delineate and clarify differences among patients with an Axis I
disorder through classifications of personality disorders, particularly the clusters. The
investigation of underlying and defining characteristics within comorbidity is central to making
accurate and useful diagnosis and subsequent treatment planning and evaluation of treatment
response. Pinpointing factors in symptomatology that distinguish patient factors that may affect
the treatment of their symptoms may have important implications with regard to treatment
planning. Distinctions in RF, if found, may suggest an approach to cataloging comorbid
symptomatology, specifically panic disorder and personality disorders.
Aim 1
To examine the relationship between Reflective Functioning (RF) and axis II disorders in
patients with primary DSM-IV panic disorder with or without agoraphobia.
Hypotheses
1. The presence of any personality disorder, as diagnosed by the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II) will predict lower RF
scores.
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2. The presence of any cluster B disorder will predict lower RF scores. This will be
evaluated through the main effect of the presence of cluster B on RF scores in a general
linear model (see further explanation in Methods below).
3. The presence of any cluster B disorder will moderate the relationship of clusters A and C
with regard to RF score. Specifically, the presence of cluster B will correspond to lower
RF scores overall (as stated in hypothesis 2) but when compared to cluster A will result in
a relatively flatter slope. That is, those subjects with both clusters A and B will have
lower RF scores than any other combination of personality disorder cluster. To
demonstrate what this relationship would look like this hypothesized interaction is
represented in Graph 1.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS
Subjects
This study will examine data collected as part of a larger, National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) funded study, “Dynamic therapy vs. CBT for Panic Disorder,” conducted by PIs
Barbara Milrod, MD, at the Weill Cornell Medical College, and Jacques Barber PhD at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. All data were collected between 2006 and
2011. The study was approved by the IRBs of Weill Cornell Medical College and University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine. Significant between-site baseline differences were found in
some diagnostic criteria that are relevant to this study, specifically, severity of panic disorder as
measured by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADISIV). Additionally, differences were found across a number of demographic variables and
number of stable medications patients used throughout the course of the treatments. For the
purpose of this dissertation, only data from one site, Weill Cornell Medical College, will be used.
All research assessments used for the current analysis were carried out at New York Presbyterian
Hospital-Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY 10065.
Procedures
Assessments:
Subjects with primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia were
recruited through IRB approved advertisements in local newspapers, through fliers, and
physician referrals. Initially, respondents were interviewed in a preliminary telephone screening
consisting of questions related to the individual's current symptoms and functioning. Subjects
who seemed appropriate for the study after the initial screening were invited to participate in a
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comprehensive evaluation, conducted over two or more sessions. All participants signed written,
informed consent.
Subjects were included in the study if they were between ages 18-70 and diagnosed with
primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia on the Anxiety Disorders
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV) (Dinardo, Brown, & Barlow,
1995). Subjects were assigned diagnostic severity ratings on the ADIS, with a range of 0-8. In
order to meet inclusion criteria for the study, subjects had panic disorder severity rating of equal
to or greater than 4. Subjects were excluded from the study if they had a lifetime history of any
psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, if they met criteria for active substance dependence (6
months remission necessary), had an organic mental disorder, or were actively suicidal. Data
from 99 patients at Cornell were used based on these criteria.
Blinded, independent research diagnosticians administered questionnaires evaluating a
range of symptoms and psychosocial functioning, including work, family, friends and romantic
relationships. All evaluations were conducted by master’s level diagnosticians with at least 35
hours of training on the ADIS-IV-L and at least 12 hours of training on symptom measures.
Diagnosticians also received training on conducting the RF and PSRF interview by Dr. Rudden,
and administration of the RF and PSRF interview was monitored by ongoing supervision
throughout the study. Patients filled out multiple self-reports. Only those measures relevant to
the present analysis are outlined below:
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV) (Dinardo,
Brown, & Barlow, 1995). The ADIS is a semi-structured diagnostic interview that focuses in
extreme detail on diagnosis among the anxiety disorders. The ADIS assesses current mood,
somatoform and substance abuse and dependence disorders, and screens for psychotic and
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conversion symptoms. Subjects are rated on a 9-point severity scale ranging from 0 (absent) to 8
(most severe case). A score of 4 corresponds to meeting DSM IV diagnostic criteria for a given
disorder.
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II). (First,
Gibbon, Spitzer & Williams, 1997). The SCID-II, as used in this study, employs the SCID-II
interview, covering the eleven DSM-IV personality disorders (including PD NOS) and the
categories of depressive and passive-aggressive personality disorders, and a Personality
Questionnaire, a screening tool consisting of 'yes' and 'no' answers, that shortens the interview by
allowing the clinician to inquire only about positive answers. Scores on individual items are
rated as a 1 (absent or false), 2 (subthreshhold), or 3 (threshold or true). Only scores of 3 are
counted as meeting criteria for each individual personality disorder, the number of which vary
depending on disorder.
Reflective Functioning interview (RF) (Rudden, Milrod, Target, Ackerman, & Graf,
2006). The Reflective Functioning interview is a semi-structured interview, an abbreviated form
of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (Main & Goldwyn, 1994). The AAI focuses on
individuals’ early relationships with early caregivers. It specifically inquires about experiences
of separations and reunions and reflections regarding the course of the relationship over time,
asking for the person's best understanding and explanation of parents' behavior. Using the AAI,
Fonagy et al. (1998) identified a subset of questions that specifically "demand" reflection,
applying the AAI Reflective Functioning scoring system to these particular questions in the
course of the administration of the entire interview. Mary Target and her colleagues constructed
a semi-structured interview comprised only of these “demand” questions, including asking about
only one parent. The group achieved moderate reliability on this interview (ICC = 0.68,
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Spearman). This adaptation was employed in an attempt to make RF evaluations less timeconsuming so it can be incorporated in the context of psychiatric outcome research, as the
inclusion of the entire AAI would make the assessment unreasonably burdensome.
Reflective Functioning is scored on an 11-point scale that evaluates the quality of
mentalization in the context of attachment relationships. Scores range from -1 to 9. A score of 1, categorized as negative RF, represents a complete repudiation of reflection, barren of
mentalization with a bizarre distortion of the mental states of others. A score of 5 describes
average reflective functioning, in which an individual demonstrates a basic capacity to link
underlying mental states to behaviors. A score of 9 is considered exceptional RF, as the subject
offers a complex, elaborate or vivid explanation of his or her parent's mental states, taking into
account variations in perspective and allowing for conflictual experiences and the changing
effects of time.
Although the RF Scale (Fonagy et al., 1998) was developed for use with the AAI, Fonagy
et al. (1993) also discussed the scale's potential use in other narrative interviews. Rudden and
colleagues piloted this adaptation as part of a sub-study specifically looking at patients diagnosed
with panic disorder. Rudden was trained in RF scoring on the AAI by Mary Target and she
achieved moderate reliability (ICC of 0.68, Spearmen Brown's two way mixed effect model).
Rudden subsequently trained two raters on scoring the abbreviated RF interview, Barbara Milrod
and Elizabeth Graf and achieved excellent reliability, determining average ICCs on the RF
portion of the interview between 0.78-0.95 (N = 62).
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Data Analysis Plan
A general linear model will be used to test the mean differences on RF for 7 possible
interactions. These interactions will be comprised of 7 possible combinations of personality
disorders using the 3 clusters of PDs as defined by the DSM-IV-TR:
One-way interactions:
1. Presence or absence of cluster A personality disorder
2. Presence or absence of cluster B personality disorder
3. Presence or absence of cluster C personality disorder
Two-way interactions:
4. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder and a cluster B personality disorder
5. Presence or absence of a cluster B personality disorder and a cluster C personality disorder
6. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder and a cluster C personality disorder
Three-way interaction
7. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder, a cluster B personality disorder, and a
cluster C personality disorder.

In order to find significant results, the study design must meet requirements to minimize the
probability of committing a Type II error and not finding a relationship between RF and category
of Axis II if it does indeed exist. Therefore, a minimum sample size will be needed for adequate
power. In this case, despite low Ns expected in each category, retrospective power analysis
showed that if differences between the means of RF are as predicted, there is adequate power
with the sample size collected. See Results section for further explication.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
The data for this project originated from a two site study, at The University of
Pennsylvania Center for Psychotherapy Research and New York Presbyterian Hospital-Weill
Cornell Medical College. As noted above, this study is based only on the baseline visits of the
Weill Cornell Medical College sample, N = 99. 29 subjects were men (29.3%) and 70 were
women (69.7%). The subjects had a mean age of 41.48 years (SD = 13.521). 65.7% identified
themselves as Caucasian, 25.3% African American, 5% Asian, 1% Native American, and 2%
mixed or other race, with 22% of subjects identifying as Hispanic.

Due to the presence of significant comorbidity in personality disorder diagnoses in this
sample, in which a simple summary of clusters would not accurately represent the diversity of
diagnoses in this sample, they will be described in multiple configurations. The purpose of
presenting these different configurations is to give a multi-dimensional picture of this sample.
At baseline, by DSM-IV-TR criteria, assessed using the SCID-II, 45 of 99 subjects did not meet
criteria for any personality disorder (45%), 2 subjects met criteria for PD NOS (2%), and 5
subjects met criteria for only Depressive PD (5%). The following subjects may also have
Depressive or Passive Aggressive PDs (from Appendix B of the DSM-IV-TR) and are listed in
the following table, but are otherwise not an organizing characteristic (as they come from the
Appendix) and are not taken into consideration in analysis of the data. Table 3 below lists all
other PD by DSM categories.
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Table 3: Personality disorders of subjects, listed by number of PDs
ONE PERSONALITY DISORDER
Not Otherwise Specified*
Depressive only*

2
5

Cluster A

Paranoid only

3

Cluster B

Narcissistic only

2

Cluster C

OCPD only
Avoidant only
Dependent only

14
3
1
23

TOTAL w/1 PD

THREE OR MORE PERSONALITY
DISORDERS
Avoidant, Dependent & OCPD

1

Paranoid, Avoidant & OCPD
Paranoid, Avoidant, Dependent & OCPD

4
1

Cluster B & C only

Borderline, Avoidant & OCPD

1

Cluster A, B & C

Paranoid, Borderline & Dependent
Paranoid, Narcissistic & OCPD

1
1
9

Cluster C only
Cluster A & C only

TWO PERSONAITY DISORDERS
OCPD & Avoidant
OCPD & Dependent
Avoidant & Dependent

2
1
1

Clusters A & B

Paranoid & Borderline

1

Clusters A & C

Paranoid & OCPD
Paranoid & Avoidant
Paranoid & Dependent

3
2
1

Clusters B & C

Narcissistic & OCPD
Borderline & Dependent
Borderline & OCPD

2
1
1
15

Any personality disorder
Did not meet full criteria for any personality disorder

54
45

Cluster C only

TOTAL w/2 PD

Totals

Sample total (n)

TOTAL W/3+ PD

TOTAL (n)

99
PD (excluding NOS and Depressive PD only)

*not included in analysis or in total of 1 PD column
OCPD = Obsessive Compulsive PD

47
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This study examined the relationship between the presence and interactions of the three
different personality clusters, the following table (Table 4) shows the number of people who
were identified with a personality disorder in each cluster. Individuals may be counted in more
than one cluster due to comorbidity.
Table 4: Presence of personality disorder by cluster
N
A
B
C

No

82

Yes

17

No

89

Yes

10

No

58

Yes

41

Any PD
(excluding NOS and
depressive PD only)

47

The cluster A group was comprised only of patients with paranoid PD, with no schizoid
or schizotypal personality disordered patients. The cluster B group included borderline PD and
narcissistic PD, with no antisocial or histrionic personality disordered patients. As Table 3 and
Table 4 demonstrate, unsurprisingly, this sample is heavily weighted toward Cluster C, the
“anxious/fearful” personality disorders, and overall OCPD was the most common personality
disorder. There are three fold more cluster C personality disorders as there are cluster A or
cluster B. This will be taken into account in the general linear model in Table 9.
For this sample, RF scores range from 2 to 7.5, and are listed in the table below (Table 5).
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Table 5: Summary of reflective function scores
RF
scores
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
Total
Mean

4.34

Median

4.0

Missing
Total

Frequency Valid Percent
4
4.0
9
9.1
13
13.1
8
8.1
21
21.2
3
3.0
16
16.2
7
7.1
10
10.1
2
2.0
4
4.0
2
2.0
99
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.0
13.1
26.3
34.3
55.6
58.6
74.7
81.8
91.9
93.9
98.0
100.0

0
99

The table below (Table 6) lists the average RF scores by each combination of personality
disorder category, although it should be noted that this comparison is condensed from the full list
of all possible interactions used for the general linear model (GLM) to detect interactions.
Rather, Table 6 is meant to grossly summarize the respective RF of each possible combination
and distinct category of personality disorder by cluster. The following categories are
distinguished: cluster A only, cluster B only, cluster C only, clusters A and B (no C), clusters A
and C (no B), clusters B and C (no A), or clusters A, B, and C.
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Table 6: Mean RF for personality disorders categorized by cluster
PD Category

N

Mean RF

SD

No A, B or C PD
Cluster A only
Cluster B only
Cluster C only
Cluster AB
Cluster AC
Cluster BC
Cluster ABC
Total
NOS and Depressive PD only
Total

45
3
2
23
1
11
5
2
92
7
99

4.37
4.67
5.25
4.24
2.50
4.46
3.70
5.25
4.34

1.39
2.52
1.06
1.45
1.08
1.15
1.20
0.35
1.38

Relationship between RF and PD
The first analysis broadly examines if there is any relationship between the presence of
any PD and RF score.
Table 7: RF scores comparing no PD to any PD
Group Statistics

Reflective function score

PD
NO
YES

N
44
55

Mean
4.205
4.445

Std. Deviation
1.3177
1.4229

Std. Error
Mean
.1986
.1919

Table 8: Independent T test of yes PD versus no PD for RF scores
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
Reflective function score
Equal variances assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

.899

Sig.
.345

t

df

-.865 97

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Mean Std. Error Difference
Sig. (2-tailed)
Difference DifferenceLower Upper
.389

-.2409

-.872 94.891 .385

-.2409

.2786

-.7938

.3120
.2762 -.7892 .3074
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The mean RF scores do not differ between subjects with PD and those without PD, with
no significance differences found. In sum, although there may be an interaction between the
cluster of PD and RF, this analysis was not able to find a predictable model. This is most likely
due to a minimal effect. However, with a larger sample size, it is possible that the nature of the
interaction could be detected. The implications of these findings will be discussed below.
A general linear model (GLM) was used to take into account all possible combinations of
cluster A, B, and C personality disorders, with regard to RF means. The results are in Table 9.
Table 9: Test for relationship between reflective function and personality disorder
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: Reflective function score
Type III
Sum of
Source

Mean

Squares

Corrected
Model
Intercept

Df
a

9.478

441.069

7

Significa Partial Eta Observed

Square

F

Squared

0.700

.672

.051

.286

228.14

.000

.715

1.000

1.354

1 441.069

Power

b

nce

A

0.174

1

0.174

.090

.765

.001

.060

B

0.392

1

0.392

.203

.654

.002

.073

C

0.276

1

0.276

.143

.706

.002

.066

A*B

1.097

1

1.097

.567

.453

.006

.116

A*C

6.609

1

6.609

3.419

.068

.036

.448

B*C

0.881

1

0.881

.456

.501

.005

.102

A*B*C

7.159

1

7.159

3.703

.057

.039

.478

Error

175.936

91

1.933

Total

2048.750

99

185.414

98

Corrected Total

a. R Squared = .051 (Adjusted R Squared = -.022)
b. Computed using alpha = .050

As seen under the column above entitled ‘Observed Power,’ the available power to
detect any of the three main effects, any of the two-way interactions or the three-way interaction
are well below conventionally accepted standards, i.e., power = .80. Applying a Bonferroni
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correction, the significance level would be p = 0.007 (versus using the standard probability level
of 0.05). If strictly using significance testing, this study would meet those conditions. However,
a statistical argument can be made that, while using a Bonferroni correction is necessary for
experimental designs, doing so for nonexperimental designs (such as this study) is not imperative
or appropriate (Garson, 2012). For this study, the data are essentially analyzed in a survey
context, as this sample was not recruited for random assignment to different conditions (unlike
the larger treatment study from which these data are drawn). In an experimental design, the goal
is to draw valid statistical inferences for the purposes of internal validity, such as to examine the
effects of an experimental treatment. Nonexperiemental studies such as this are designed for
external (rather than internal) validity; that is, the purpose of this study is to attempt to validly
generalize any findings to a larger population, in this case, patients with panic disorder, with
personality disorders. In this context, the sample is not a probability sample, but rather
considered a convenience sample, or non-random sample (Garson, 2012, p21). Under these
conditions, significance tests are less meaningful, both statistically and generally, than examining
effect sizes. Using the test for significance, these findings indicate no significant interactions
between the clusters of A, B and C and RF scores but that there may be a trend towards a threeway interaction, as p = 0.057.
The column entitled ‘Partial Eta Squared’ in Table 7 calculates the proportion of the
variability attributable to an effect of the interaction between clusters A, B, and C has to predict
RF scores. This is described as the effect size; in this case, the interaction of clusters A, B and C
has an effect size of η²partial = 0.039. In other words, the effect of the interaction accounts for
3.9% of the outcome (in this case the RF score) plus associated calculated error. Partial eta
squared equals 0.036 for the two-way interaction of clusters A and C. This is a small effect size,
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as generally small effects using partial eta squared are estimated at 0.01, medium effects at 0.06,
and large effects at 0.14 (Miles & Shevlin, 2012; Cohen et al., 2003). This model suggests that a
small interaction may exist between two variables determined by the presence of a third variable.
The amount of the effect on this three way interaction is considered small. Note that in
Table 9, this effect size equals 0.039 for the three way interaction for all three clusters (the same
effect when covariance is not taken into consideration). In this case, there are three possibilities:
1) that there are different possible interactions between cluster A and B (and outcome of RF),
which vary with the presence or absence of cluster C; 2) that there are different possible
interactions between cluster A and C (and outcome of RF), which vary with the presence or
absence of cluster B; or 3) that there are different possible interactions between cluster B and C
(and outcome of RF), which vary with the presence or absence of cluster A. The a priori
hypothesis based on the literature was that the presence of cluster B is principal and likely the
moderating variable that combinations of cluster A and C vary on with regards to RF score.
Table 10: Comparison differences in mean RF scores
Pairwise Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Ref lectiv e f unction score
95% Conf idence Interv al f or
Mean
Dif f erencea
Dif f erence
a
A
C
(I) B
(J) B
(I-J)
St d. Error
Sig.
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
.00
.00
.00
1.00
-.885
1.002
.380
-2.875
1.106
1.00
.00
.885
1.002
.380
-1.106
2.875
1.00
.00
1.00
.539
.686
.434
-.824
1.902
1.00
.00
-.539
.686
.434
-1.902
.824
1.00
.00
.00
1.00
2.167
1.606
.181
-1.023
5.356
1.00
.00
-2.167
1.606
.181
-5.356
1.023
1.00
.00
1.00
-.795
1.069
.459
-2.919
1.328
1.00
.00
.795
1.069
.459
-1.328
2.919
Based on estimated marginal means
a. Adjustment f or multiple comparisons: Least Signif icant Dif f erence (equiv alent to no adjustments).
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Note in Table 10 that none of these comparisons reach a level of significance. This is
despite of the fact that the use of the Least Significant Difference (LSD) is considered liberal in
that it runs the risk of meeting significance by error (committing a Type I error). Therefore,
although there may be a trend towards an interaction between clusters A, B and C on RF scores,
the effect of this interaction is small and no direction of this relationship can be determined in
this sample. In fact, the observed plot of the relationship between the clusters and RF score
(Graph 2) does not indicate the hypothesized interaction. The assumption was that the presence
of Cluster B would correspond to lower RF scores, but that the presence of cluster A would
result in a relatively flatter slope (Graph 1).
Graph 2: OBSERVED Reflective Functioning (RF)
by Presence/Absence of Cluster B by Clusters A x C
5.50

Combinations of Odd (A)
& Anxious (C) diagnoses

5.00

NO A DX, NO C DX
NO A DX, YES C DX
YES A DX, NO C DX
YES A DX, YES C DX

4.50

Mean RF 4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50

NO B DX

YES B DX

DRAMATIC (B) DX
In the hypothesized model, cluster B would yield predictably low RF scores. The
observed plot does not characterize the hypothesis. In fact, there is no discernable pattern in this
model. However, it should be noted that the ns for these categories are imbalanced and small
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(see Table 6). For example, only 10 subjects in total met for any cluster B diagnoses. Only 2
subjects met criteria for cluster B alone, 1 subject met criteria for clusters A and B (but not C), 5
subjects met criteria for cluster B and cluster C (but not A), and 2 subjects met criteria for a
diagnosis in each cluster. Furthermore, as discussed above, the interaction itself is found to have
a small effect.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Panic disorder with comorbid personality disorders and reflective functioning
The present study examined the relationship between reflective functioning and comorbid
personality disorders in a population of panic disorder patients. Analyses explored whether there
was an interaction between reflective functioning scores and the types and combinations of
personality disorders as classified by clusters A, B and C. This analysis was not able to observe
a predictable model to find or explain an interaction between PD and RF score in this sample.
However, there was a trend toward a small effect of a three-way interaction between the clusters
and RF scores, although the nature of this possible relationship was not established.
There are two arguments to be made to explain these results, essentially that there are no
far-reaching conclusions to be drawn from this project, but some more specific questions are
raised. The first explanation for these findings, that RF does not have a strong relationship to
different clusters of personality disorders in this panic disorder sample, is that panic
symptomatology overrode any other symptoms of psychological processes. The second
explanation is that deficits in mentalization (as captured by RF scores) may not be apparent in all
personality disorders, but rather a specific subset of PDs with various comorbidities. For
example, borderline PD as comorbid among primary panic disorder patients may not manifest
the same phenomena as in patients with primary borderline PD.
The relationship between Axis I and Axis II, in terms of the primary and driving
pathology, may be one major factor in why the variances in RF scores were not statistically
significantly different from each other within this sample. As much as there have been
assumptions about the effects of Axis II in the treatment of Axis I disorders, as discussed in the
review on comorbidity, there have also been arguments against the conjecture that Axis II is a
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confounding factor that primarily interferes with Axis I. Specifically, that due to panic
symptoms (or other anxiety disorders) being the principal and dominant pathology, an accurate
sense of a person’s long term personality traits during an acute phase of panic disorder is difficult
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005). While an obvious explanation, it may simply be the case that with
all other diagnoses secondary to panic, the patients in this sample with personality disorders are
clinically different from those patients with primary personality disorders.
Furthermore, there is speculation that acute states of panic exaggerate a patient’s
personality vulnerabilities. To quote a suggestion made by Skodol et al. (1995) in their paper on
“Patterns of anxiety and personality disorder comorbidity,” the presence of personality disorders
may be
an indication of chronic impairment in functioning that may accompany
certain cases of anxiety disorder and may worsen during an acute
exacerbation of an Axis I disorder. (Skodol et al., 1995, p 370.)
In this case, panic disorder could be an overriding factor. Given that the patients in this
sample were selected for panic disorder as their primary complaint, corroborated by a clinical
interviewer as part of the screening process, any personality disorders would be less prominent
and potentially less influential on RF. The interference of a comorbid personality disorder in
day-to-day functioning may amplify the panic disorder, reinforcing the debilitating
symptomatology. Alternatively, when panic symptoms are acute and primary, a personality
disorder could perhaps be less influential or prominent in impairments of RF. Specific to this
study, personality disorders may not have a direct, quantifiable relationship with reflective
functioning in patients with panic disorder. This sample constitutes a different population from a
primary personality disorder population, who experience interference in their lives primarily
because of their personality disorder, even if they also meet criteria for panic disorder or other
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Axis I disorders. Therefore, the personality disorders in this sample of panic disorder patients,
although detectable, may not be the primary and driving factor in low reflective functioning for
this group. On average, this sample had “low” RF scores, but with no significant differences
between those with personality disorders (averaging 4.4, SD = 1.4) and those without personality
disorders (averaging 4.2, SD = 1.3). As an aside, however, it is notable that this “low” RF is
comparatively not as low as found in existing studies of baseline RF and BPD treatment studies,
such as Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2010; average RF = 2.7, SD = 1.2) or Levy and colleagues
(2006;

averages for three treatment groups were 2.86, SD = 1.16; 3.31, SD = 0.95; and 2.8, SD

= 0.80). A further direction of study could isolate other factors within this sample, such as
childhood trauma or agoraphobia to find other causes of the low RF. Additionally, future
research could investigate individuals with primary diagnoses of BPD with co-morbid panic
disorder with or without agoraphobia to examine differences in RF.
A second argument to explain the lack of findings in this analysis is that no relationship
may exist between reflective functioning and personality disorders in the context of a primary
anxiety disorder, even if there remains an open question with regard to borderline personality
disorder specifically. In the existing literature, there have been mixed findings with regard to the
relationship between Axis I and Axis II disorders and RF (Bouchard et al., 2008) in clinical and
nonclinical samples. There has been some evidence of a relationship between impaired
reflective function and borderline personality disorder in comparison to a non-psychiatric group
(Chiesa & Fonagy, 2013). This current study is consistent with a previous study on Axis I and
Axis II disorders and RF, in which no association was found between RF and number of Axis I
and Axis II disorders (Fischer-Kern et al., 2010).

64

The results of this analysis, that RF does not provide a window for making distinctions
within a panic disorder population that correlates with psychiatric diagnosis or symptoms per se,
may not be generalizable to other Axis I disorders, nor to patients who are hospitalized. Other
projects, that may otherwise appear comparable to this paper, examine populations that may have
a different ability to mentalize. For example, in a study by Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2013)
regarding depression, as summarized in the literature review section, patients who were
hospitalized with primary major depression were shown to have lower RF scores than matched
healthy controls.
Overall, the sample in this study did have high levels of Axis I comorbidity, with 80% of
subjects meeting DSM criteria for agoraphobia, 70% of subjects meeting criteria for any anxiety
disorder other than panic disorder, and 70% meeting criteria for other Axis I disorders (such as
depression). However, despite the high symptomatology found within this sample was
conducted in an outpatient setting, the majority of patients were self-referred, were either
working or in school, and had no history of hospitalization; thus they were functioning at a
higher level than studies conducted on inpatients. The patients in this study were required to
attend the in-person baseline assessment, which presumes potential agoraphobic symptoms to be
manageable to the extent that subjects can come to the facility, even if they were accompanied.
Other studies showing a relationship between RF and other Axis I disorders, such as depression
(Fischer-Kern et al., 2013) or anorexia (Ward et al., 2001), were inpatients at the time of their
assessments. Although clear assessment of severity of symptoms for either of these samples is
not available, these inpatients may have had higher levels of symptomatology overall that would
justify a psychiatric hospitalization.
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Another explanation for the lack of findings in this study may be the use of the
abbreviated form of RF interview, which may focus more specifically on patients’ capacities for
mentalization of others’ minds rather than their own. The RF scale itself conflates representation
of self with representations of other, but higher RF scores are expected to reflect good working
capacities in both. Fonagy and colleagues (1998) also acknowledge that mentalization may not
be a fully consistent capacity across situations or relationships:

RF is a strand within the developmental web, one of the many
distinct control systems that are neither strongly connected with
each other, nor coordinated or integrated. The “fractionation” or
splitting of all abilities as a function of tasks and domains is well
demonstrated, and we might expect RF to be subject to the same
kind of developmental décalage (unevenness) which characterizes
the rest of cognitive development…Unevenness across situations is
likely to remain prevalent even in adults, especially when they are
emotional (Fonagy et al., 1998, p. 8).
This RF interview, in the interest of making the overall assessment less burdensome, asks
patients to describe only one parent and allows them to choose which parent to speak about.
Further, it asks patients to choose and describe another significant person in their lives (typically
a less emotionally-charged relationship). As discussed in the review of the psychodynamic
theory on panic disorder, patients may have representations of themselves as weak and that
others are powerful (Shear et al., 1993). The demand questions for this abbreviated form of RF
are focused on the representation of others. The patients’ scores will be different than if asked to
reflect on their representation of themselves by the very nature of the patient’s object relations,
rather than a true measure of their capacity to reflect on both the mental states of themselves and
others.
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The lack of findings in this study and the potential explanations to account for these
results suggest interesting new directions for study. There have been some assumptions about
the primacy of personality disorders; that is, the presence of personality disorders, especially
borderline or narcissistic PD, can dwarf Axis I disorders, and therefore disrupt primary Axis I
disorder treatment that does not specifically account for Axis II disorders. However, the primary
symptoms that debilitate a patient’s functioning may override or shape the expression of
personality difficulties. One direction of study would be to examine the outcomes of the
psychotherapy for panic disorder with regard to PD, looking for patterns of response.
Reflective functioning may not help to make distinctions with regard to Axis I and Axis
II comorbidity, although the lack of findings here may be specific to panic disorder. Further
study into making distinctions between patients with Axis II disorders with regard to RF may
yield deeper understanding of the nature of RF as a corollary to the diagnostic process.
Limitations of this study
Sampling limitations:
This project has several significant limitations; therefore, the generalizability of these
findings must be couched in the context of this analysis. This study may be limited in its scope
of applicability. This project only included patients who could come to the research offices and
planned to tolerate twice weekly out-patient psychotherapy. Therefore, it may have excluded the
most disturbed patients, especially those with severe agoraphobia such as those who could not
leave their homes, even with a companion. Furthermore, the mean age of the sample is 41.48
years (SD = 13.521), putting the majority of subjects approximately within the age range of 2855. This is an older sample as compared to many treatment studies, including Fischer-Kern et al.
(2010) (mean age = 27.7, SD = 7.3) and the Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders
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Study, in which the entry age of subjects (in the ten-year study) ranged 18-45 years (Skodol et al.
2005). The latter study found a pronounced drop in symptomatology over time across all PDs
(as measured on the Diagnostic Interview for DSM–IV Personality Disorders (DIPD-IV;
Zanarini, Frankenburg, Sickel, & Yong, 1996)), particularly within the first four years of the
study. BPD symptomatology, including dissociation, dysphoria and cognitive distortions,
declined over time (Zanarini et al. 2008; Reed et al. 2012; Zanarini et al, 2013). It is difficult,
therefore, to draw any conclusion about the relative low levels of personality pathology in this
panic patient sample.
However, with regard to the distributions of personality disorders, the sample sizes for
each cluster are uneven and small in some cases. In particular, cluster B were not well
represented, and OCPD was the most represented. In previous studies, there has been a more
robust link between cluster B disorders (especially BPD) and low RF, than has been yet found
with other personality disorders. Additionally, several factor analytic studies examining the
DSM PD constructs and clusters have questioned if OCPD stands apart from clusters A, B and C
altogether, with some evidence that a four-factor structural model better accounts data from
clinical samples (Sanislow et al. 2009). A more meaningful and robust comparison between the
groups may be made with balanced sample sizes, which would have entailed a different
recruitment strategy and study design.

Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between reflective functioning and personality disorders in
a sample of patients with primary panic disorder. Using the statistical models above, although
some interaction between clusters A, B and C may exist, as a statistical trend was apparent, no
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meaningful relationship was established. RF was not found to be predictive of the presence, type
or number of SCID II diagnosed personality disorders. The results may suggest that in a sample
with a primary diagnosis of panic disorder, RF does not correlate with differences in personality
pathology diagnosed on SCID II, such as has been observed in previous studies with a primary
personality disorder sample (Levy et al., 2006). This study may demonstrate limitations in the
use of RF to distinguish between panic disorder and personality disorders. Further study into the
relationship between PDs and panic disorder is warranted, particularly with regard to what
aspects of panic or personality symptomatology become amplified or less observable and are
primarily challenging and problematic for the patient.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version
(ADIS IV) (PANIC SECTION only)
PANIC DISORDER
I. INTIAL INQUIRY
1a. Do you currently have times when you feel a sudden rush of intense fear or discomfort
(what someone might call a “panic attack”)?
YES ___ NO___
IF YES, skip to 2a.
b. IF NO, Have you ever had times when you have felt a sudden rush of intense fear or
discomfort?
YES___ NO___
IF YES, When was the most recent time this occurred?
___________________________________________________________________________
IF YES to either 1a or 1b., or uncertain, continue inquiry.
Otherwise skip to AGORAPHOBIA.
2a. In what kinds of situation(s) do you have these feelings? Where are you most likely to
have these feelings?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
b. Do you ever have these feelings come from “out of the blue,” for no apparent reason, or in
situations where you did not expect them to occur?
YES___ NO____
If patient indicates the presence of unexpected panic symptoms, further inquiry is necessary
to determine if these symptoms occur in a number of situational contexts or whether the
symptoms are circumscribed to a particular type of situation (as can occur in Social or
Specific Phobia).
2. How long does it usually take for the rush of fear /discomfort to reach its peak level?
______ minutes
(Must be less than or equal to 10 minutes to meet diagnostic criteria)
3. How long does the fear/discomfort usually last at its peak level?

______ minutes

If no evidence of unexpected (uncued) panic attacks that peak in less than
10 minutes, consider ending the interview or, if uncertain, continue interview.
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II. SYMPTOM RATINGS
In this section rate symptoms only for panic attacks that occur UNEXPECTEDLY in a variety of
situations. Panic symptoms that are limited to a single stimulus (e.g., enclosed places or heights,
social situations, obsessional content, etc.) should not be rated here.
In mixed or uncertain cases, ratings can be completed in this section.
Rate the severity of each symptom that is typical of the most recent period of attacks and, when
appropriate, what characterized a typical attack in a separate past episode of disturbance. If a
symptom is experienced during only some attacks (i.e., does not typically occur during an
attack), enclose the rating in parentheses.
DSM-IV defines a panic attack as a discrete period of intense fear or discomfort, in which at
least 4 of the symptoms listed below developed abruptly and reached a peak within 10 minutes.
If typical attacks do not include 4 symptoms, determine if any attack has included 4 symptoms.
Use the following inquiry when rating symptoms:
1) During the panic attack, do you usually experience _____________?
2) Using Scale A, how distressing/severe is the symptom to you? If there is any doubt about
whether the symptom is typical, ask: Do you experience this nearly every time you have an
attack?
0--------1----------2---------3---------4---------5---------6---------7---------8
None
Mild
Moderate
Severe
Very severe
FULL
a. Palpitations, pounding heart, or accelerated heart rate
_____
b. Sweating
_____
c. Trembling or shaking
_____
d. Shortness of breath or smothering sensations
_____
e. Feeling of choking
_____
f. Chest pain or discomfort
_____
g. Nausea or stomach distress
_____
h. Chills or hot flushes
_____
i. Dizziness, unsteady feelings, lightheadedness, or faintness _____
j. Feelings of unreality or being detached from oneself
_____
k. Numbing or tingling sensations
_____
l. Fear of dying
_____
m. Fear of going crazy
_____
n. Fear of doing something uncontrolled
_____

LSA COMMENTS
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____ ___________
____
___________
____
___________
____
___________

2a. If the patient reports 4 or more symptoms per typical attack of at least Moderate Severity
(i.e., 4 or above), ask:
Do you have periods (attack/spells) when you have a sudden, unexpected rush of
fear/discomfort that is accompanied by only one or two these symptoms?
YES____ NO_____
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If YES, go back and rate severity of symptoms under Limited Symptom Attack (LSA)
column.
b. If the patient reports less than 4 symptoms per typical attack, ask:
Do you have periods (attack/spells) when you have had a sudden, unexpected rush of
fear/discomfort that is accompanied by four or more of these symptoms?
YES ____ NO_____
If YES, go back and rate severity of symptoms under Full Attack (FULL) column, switching
rating for typical, recent panic attacks to the Limited Symptom Attack (LSA) column.
III. CURRENT EPISODE
Now I want to ask you a series of questions about this current period of panic attacks.
1a. How many panic attacks have you had in the past month?
________Full ________Limited
b. How many panic attacks have you had in the past 6 months?
________ Full _______Limited
Using the following scale as a guide, rate how much you have been worried about, or how
apprehensive you have been, of having another panic attack.
0---------1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6---------7-----------8
No
Rarely
Occasionally
Frequently
Constantly
Worry/
worried/
worried/
worried/
worried/
No
Mild
Moderate
Severe
Extreme
apprehension
apprehension
apprehension
apprehension
apprehension
If no evidence of persistent concern/worry about panic over past month ask, Since your first
attacks, has there been a period of a month a more when you were worried that you might have
more attacks?
YES _____ NO __________
If YES, When was this?
FROM______________ TO____________
b. Specifically, what types of things do you anticipate happening as the result of the attacks?
(Inquire about immediate and long-term consequences.)
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
c. Have the attacks caused you to change your behavior/lifestyle in any way?
YES______ NO_______
If YES, how so? ______________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
Situational avoidance (i.e., agoraphobia):
___________________________________________________________________________
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Interoceptive sensitivity/avoidance (e.g., physical exertion, sex, caffeine, expressing strong
emotions, hot places, thrilling movies, activities that heighten awareness of bodily sensations):
____________________________________________________________________________
Safety signals (e.g., medications, people, access to telephones/car):
____________________________________________________________________________
Distraction (loud music, keeping TV on, staying involved in activities):
____________________________________________________________________________
Lifestyle changes (e.g., reduction in “stressful” activities):
____________________________________________________________________________
(Patient must have 2a, 2b, OR 2C for at least one month in order to meet Panic Disorder
criteria.)
3. In what ways have the panics interfered with your life (e.g., daily routine, job, social
activities)? ; How much are you bothered about having the attacks?
___________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
Using Scale A as a guide, rate how much panic attacks have interfered with your life.
interference: ___________________
Using the same scale, rate how much distress the panic attacks have caused you.
distress: __________________
(SCALE A)
0----------1----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7------------8
None
Mild
Moderate
Severe
Very severe
4a. Can you recall your first panic attack that began this current period of attacks?
YES _____ NO_____
If YES, When did it happen? ______________Month _______________Year
b. Were you under any type of stress during this time?
YES ______NO _____
What was happening in your life at the time?
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Were you experiencing any difficulties or changes in:
(1) Family/relationship?_________________________________________
(2)Work/school? _____________________________________________
(3)Finances? _________________________________________________
(4)Legal matters? _____________________________________________
(5)Health (self/others)? _________________________________________
c. On the day of this first attack, were you taking any type of drug? (Include alcohol/caffeine.)
YES _______ NO ________
If YES, specify type/amount: ___________________________________________________
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5. Just prior to or since the panic attacks began, have you been regularly taking any types of
drugs?
YES _______ NO ________
Specify (type; amount; dates of use): __________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
6. Just prior to or since the panic attacks began, have you had any physical condition such as
inner ear problems, mitral valve prolapse, pregnancy, hyperthyroidism, hypoglycemia?
YES_______ NO_______
Specify (type; date of onset/remission): ________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
7. When did the panic attacks become a problem in that they occurred regularly and/or you
became very worried or anxious about having more attacks, or the attacks caused a change in
your behavior in some way? (Note: if patient is vague in date of onset, attempt to ascertain
more specific information, e.g., by linking onset to objective life events).
_________________________________________________________________________
Date of Onset: _______________Month: ________________ Year: ______________
8. What types of things seem to trigger the attacks? [Inquire about internal (thoughts,
sensations, images) and external (feared situations, situations that elicit heightened self-focused
attention, physical effects of various activities such as caffeine, exercise, etc). triggers.]
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
9. When a panic attack occurs, how do you handle it?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
10. Besides this current period of panic attacks, have there been other, separate periods of time
before this when you have had these attacks?
If YES, the clinician should consider inquiring about past episode, particularly if the
clinician determines that this information may be important for clinical or diagnostic
reasons.
Date(s) of prior episodes: _________________________________________________

CURRENT PANIC DISORDER?

YES_______ NO_______
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Appendix 2: Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders
(SCID II)
SCID-II QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS: These questions are about the kind of person you generally are; that is, how
you usually have felt or behaved over the past several years. Fill in “Yes” or “No.” Answer all
the questions. If a question is unclear, pick the answer that best describes the kind of person that
you are.
1. Have you avoided jobs or assignments that involved having to deal with a
{ Yes { No
lot of other people?
2. Do you avoid getting involved with people unless you are certain they will
{ Yes { No
like you?
3. Do you find it hard to be “open” even with people you are close to?
{ Yes { No
4. Do you often worry about being criticized or rejected in social situations?
{ Yes { No
5. Are you usually quiet when you meet people?
{ Yes { No
6. Do you believe that you are not as good, as smart, or as attractive as most
{ Yes { No
other people?
7. Are you afraid to try new things?
{ Yes { No
8. Do you need a lot of advice or reassurance from others before you can make { Yes { No
everyday decisions – such as what to wear or what in order in a restaurant?
9. Do you depend on other people to handle important areas in your life such
{ Yes { No
as finances, child care, living arrangements?
10. Do you find it hard to disagree with people even when you think they are
{ Yes { No
wrong?
11. Do you find it hard to start work on tasks when there is no one to help you? { Yes { No
12. Have you often volunteered to do things that are unpleasant?
{ Yes { No
13. Do you usually feel uncomfortable when you are by yourself?
{ Yes { No
14. When a close relationship ends, do you quickly need to find someone else
{ Yes { No
you can rely on?
15. Do you worry a lot about being left alone to take care of yourself?
{ Yes { No
16. Are you the kind of person who focuses on details, order, and organization, { Yes { No
or likes to make lists and schedules?
17. Do you have trouble finishing jobs because you spend so much time trying
{ Yes { No
to get things exactly right?
18. Do you or other people feel that you are so devoted to work (school) that
{ Yes { No
you have no time left for anyone else or for just having fun?
19. Do you have very high standards about what is right and what is wrong?
{ Yes { No
20. Do you have trouble throwing things out because they might come in handy { Yes { No
some day?
21. Is it hard for you to let other people help out if they don’t agree to do things { Yes { No
exactly the way you want?
22. Is it hard for you to spend money on yourself and other people even when
{ Yes { No
you have enough?
23. Are you often so sure you are right that it doesn’t matter what other people
{ Yes { No
say?
24. Have other people told you that you are stubborn or rigid?
{ Yes { No
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25. When someone asks you to do something that you don’t want to do, do you { Yes { No
say “yes” but then work slowly or do a bad job?
26. Often, if you don’t want to do something you just “forget” to do it?
{ Yes { No
27. Do you often feel that other people don’t understand you, or don’t appreciate { Yes { No
how much you do?
28. Are you often gloomy and likely to get into arguments?
{ Yes { No
29. Have you often found that most of your bosses, teachers, supervisors, doctors, { Yes { No
and others who are supposed to know what they are doing really don’t?
30. Do you often think that it’s not fair that other people have more than you do? { Yes { No
31. Do you often complain that only bad things happen to you?
{ Yes { No
32. Do you often go back and forth between telling someone off and then trying { Yes { No
to make up by doing whatever they want?
33. Do you usually feel unhappy or like life is no fun?
{ Yes { No
34. Do you believe that you are basically an inadequate person and often feel
{ Yes { No
not good about yourself?
35. Do you often put yourself down?
{ Yes { No
36. Are you a worrier?
{ Yes { No
37. Do you often judge others harshly and easily find fault with them?
{ Yes { No
38. Do you think that most people are basically no good?
{ Yes { No
39. Do you almost always expect the worst?
{ Yes { No
40. Do you often feel guilty about things you have or haven’t done?
{ Yes { No
41. Do you often have to keep an eye out to stop people from using you or
{ Yes { No
hurting you?
42. Do you spend a lot of time wondering if you can trust your friends or the
{ Yes { No
people you work with?
43. Do you find that it is best not to let other people know too much about you? { Yes { No
44. Do you often pick up hidden meanings in what people say or do?
{ Yes { No
45. Are you the kind of person who holds grudges or takes a long time to
{ Yes { No
forgive people who have insulted or slighted you?
46. Are there many people that you can’t forgive because they did or said
{ Yes { No
something to you a long time ago?
47. Do you often get angry or lash out when someone criticizes or insults you
{ Yes { No
in some way?
48. Have you often suspected that your spouse or partner has been unfaithful?
{ Yes { No
49. When you are out in public and see people talking, do you often feel that they { Yes { No
are talking about you?
50. Do you often get the feeling that things that appear to be unrelated are really { Yes { No
meant to give you a special meaning?
51. Do you often detect hidden messages in seemingly unrelated events?
{ Yes { No
52. Have you ever felt that you could make things happen just by making a wish { Yes { No
or thinking about them?
53. Have you had personal experiences with the supernatural?
{ Yes { No
54. Do you believe that you have a “sixth sense” that allows you to know and
{ Yes { No
predict things that others can’t?
55. Do you often think that objects or shadows are really people or animals or
{ Yes { No
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that noises are actually people’s voices?
56. Have you had the sense that some person or force is around you, even
though you cannot see anyone?
57. Do you often see auras or energy fields around people?
58. Are there very few people that you are really close to outside of you
immediate family?
59. Do you often feel nervous when you are around other people?
60. Do you NOT feel close relationships with other people like family or friends?
61. Would you rather do things alone than with other people?
62. Could you be content without being sexually involved with another person?
63. Are there really very few things that give you a lot of pleasure?
64. Does it not matter to you what people think of you?
65. Do you find that nothing makes you very happy or very sad?
66. Do you like to be the center of attention?
67. Do you flirt a lot?
68. Do you often dress in a sexy way, even when you are going to work or
doing errands?
69. Do you try to draw attention to yourself by the way you look or the way you
dress?
70. Do you often make a point of being dramatic or colorful?
71. Do you find that your own opinions and feelings about things are not very
strong so that you go along with other people’s opinions?
72. Do you become very close with nearly everyone you meet?
73. Do most people fail to appreciate your very special talents or
accomplishments?
74. Have people told you that you have too high an opinion of yourself?
75. Do you think a lot about the power, fame, or recognition that will be yours
someday?
76. Do you think a lot about the perfect romance that will be yours someday?
77. When you have a problem, do you almost always insist on seeing the top
person?
78. Do you feel its worth spending time only with people who are special or
important?
79. Is it very important to you that people pay attention to you or admire you in
some way?
80. Do you think that it’s not necessary to follow certain rules or social
conventions when they get in your way?
81. Do you often feel that there are reasons why other people should give you
especially good treatment?
82. Do you often find it necessary to step on a few toes to get what you want?
83. Do you often have to put your needs above other people’s?
84. Do you often expect other people to do what you ask without question
because of who you are?
85. Do you often feel that it’s not important to deal with other people’s concerns
or feelings?

{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
{ Yes { No
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86. Does it burn you up when other people do well?
{ Yes { No
87. Do you feel that others are often envious of you?
{ Yes { No
88. Do you find that very few people are worth your time and attention?
{ Yes { No
89. Have you often become frantic when you thought that someone you really
{ Yes { No
care about was going to leave you?
90. Do your relationships with other people you really care about have lots
{ Yes { No
of ups and downs?
91. Have you abruptly changed your sense of who you are and where you are
{ Yes { No
headed?
92. Does your sense of who you are often change dramatically?
{ Yes { No
93. Have there been lots of sudden changes in your goals, career plans, religious { Yes { No
beliefs, and so on?
94. Have you often done things impulsively?
{ Yes { No
95. Have you tried to hurt or kill yourself or threatened to do so?
{ Yes { No
96. Have you ever cut, burned, or scratched yourself on purpose?
{ Yes { No
97. Are you a “moody” person?
{ Yes { No
98. Do you often feel empty inside?
{ Yes { No
99. Do you often have temper outbursts or get so angry that you lose control?
{ Yes { No
100. Do you hit people or throw things when you get angry?
{ Yes { No
101. Do even little things get you very angry?
{ Yes { No
102. Do you get suspicious of other people or feel especially spaced out when
{ Yes { No
you are under a lot of stress?
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT THINGS THAT YOU MAY HAVE DONE
BEFORE YOU WERE FIFTEEN
103. …did you bully or threaten other kids?
{ Yes { No
104. …did you start fights?
{ Yes { No
105. …did you use a weapon in a fight, like a bat, brick, broken bottle, a knife or { Yes { No
gun?
106. …did you ever deliberately try to cause someone physical pain and
{ Yes { No
suffering?
107. …did you sometimes hurt animals on purpose?
{ Yes { No
108. …did you ever forcibly take something from someone by threatening,
{ Yes { No
robbing, or mugging him or her?
109. …did you ever force someone to have sex with you?
{ Yes { No
110. …did you set fires?
{ Yes { No
111. …did you deliberately damage things that weren’t yours?
{ Yes { No
112. …did you ever break into a house, other building, or car?
{ Yes { No
113. …did you lie a lot or con other people?
{ Yes { No
114. …did you ever steal or shoplift things?
{ Yes { No
115. …did you run away from home and stay away overnight?
{ Yes { No
BEFORE YOU WERE 13
116. …would you often stay out very late, long after the time you were supposed { Yes { No
to be home?
117. …did you often skip school?
{ Yes { No
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Appendix 3: Reflective Functioning Interview:
1. A. Can you tell me about one of your parents? What is that parent like?
B. How do you think your relationship came to be that way?
2. A. Can you tell me about your relationship?
B. Do you have any thoughts about how your relationship came to be that way?
(Alternative form of question: …about how these conflicts and problems
developed?…about how it came to be such a close relationship?)
3. Can you tell me about a specific memory of that relationship or about that parent from
childhood? (ages 5-12?)
4. Can you tell me how this relationship has changed over time?
(Ask why it has changed if they don’t address this in their answer.)
5. Can you tell me what impact this parent has had on your life?

6. Can you tell me why you chose to talk about this parent?
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